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Abstract 
Why is the exercise of political power highly concentrated in some polities and widely dispersed 
in others? We argue that one persistent causal factor is demographic. Populous polities are 
characterized by less concentrated structures of authority. To explain this relationship we 
invoke two mechanisms: efficiency and trust. The theory is demonstrated with a wide variety of 
empirical measures and in two settings: (1) cross-country analyses including most sovereign 
states and extending back to the 19th century and (2) within-country analyses focused on states, 
counties, and localities in the United States.  
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Introduction 
Since Aristotle pondered the virtues of rule by one, few, and many the question of political 
concentration has played a key role in debates about good governance. Many writers believe 
that only when power is diffused across many levels and many institutions are conditions 
optimal for constraining the abuse of power, achieving stability and credible commitment, 
ensuring property rights, and maximizing the utility of citizens with diverse values and interests 
(Breton 1996; Buchanan 1995; Elazar 1987; Gordon 1999; Inman & Rubinfeld 1997; Kollman 
2013; North & Weingast 1989; Oates 1972; Ostrom 1971; Tiebout 1956; Weingast 1995). 
Others view power dispersion more skeptically – as an invitation to special interest politics, 
weak government, and collective action dilemmas (Bagehot 1867/1963; Bardhan & Mookherjee 
2000; Gerring & Thacker 2008; Keefer, Narayan & Vishwanath 2006; Prud’homme 1995; 
Schattschneider 1942). According to a third perspective, the success of dispersion is contingent, 
i.e., dependent on contextual factors and on the type of decentralization being considered, or 
mixed, setting in motion offsetting virtues and vices with no straightforward implications for 
the overall quality of governance (Bardhan 2002; Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya 2007; Oxhorn, 
Tulchin & Selee 2004; Treisman 2007; Tsebelis 2000).  
In this study, we focus on the prior question. Why is the exercise of political power 
highly concentrated in some polities and widely dispersed in others? At one extreme stands 
North Korea, where a small cadre micro-manages the personal lives of citizens with virtually no 
constraints. At another extreme lie polities like India, Switzerland, and the United States – along 
with confederations and international organizations such as the European Union, the United 
Nations, and the World Trade Organization – where decisionmaking power is diffused across 
many independent actors. What might account for the extraordinary variation we find in power 
concentration throughout the world today? 
While the causes of democracy have received a great deal of attention from scholars 
(Coppedge 2012), the sources of power concentration are less often studied. Extant work on 
the subject focuses mostly on the vertical dimension, i.e., the balance of power between higher- 
and lower-level governments. Analyses are generally centered on democracies, the OECD, and 
the postwar era (e.g., Arzaghi & Henderson 2005; Garrett & Rodden 2003; Gibler 2010; 
Hooghe & Marks 2013; Hooghe, Marks & Schakel 2010; Letelier 2005; Wibbels 2005). Many 
studies are limited to a small set of countries, especially those that are highly decentralized or 
have recently centralized or decentralized (e.g., Benz & Broschek 2013; Dickovick 2011; Eaton 
2004; Eaton & Dickovick 2004; Falleti 2005, 2010; Garman, Haggard & Willis 2001; Grossman 
& Lewis 2014; Manor 1999; Montero & Samuels 2004; O’Neill 2005; Wibbels 2005; Willis, 
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Garman & Haggard 1999; Ziblatt 2006).  
As a complement to these focused studies we intend to broaden the theoretical and 
empirical purview. Our theory encompasses both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
power. It applies to all manner of polities – supra-national, national, and subnational – so long 
as each unit enjoys some degree of policymaking autonomy and so long as the community of 
individuals within that polity is beyond the number that could conveniently congregate in one 
location.1 The purview of the analysis extends throughout the modern era, inaugurated by the 
English, American, and French Revolutions.  
With this set of scope-conditions, we argue that the degree of power concentration in a 
polity is affected by the number of people residing within that polity. The larger the population, 
the more likely that power will be diffused. Undergirding this relationship are two causal 
mechanisms: a search for greater efficiency and a quest to resolve problems of trust. Each of these 
mechanisms, we claim, exerts pressure on leaders and citizens of a large polity to diffuse power. 
To test the relationship between size and power concentration we compile a cross-
country dataset that incorporates most sovereign countries and a panel format extending as far 
back as the data will allow (in some cases to the early nineteenth century). We also provide a 
more focused examination of a single country – the United States – which offers a range of 
levels and types of government and a rich array of data with which to measure the degree of 
power concentration across subnational units. 
The paper begins with a presentation of the argument. We then turn to crossnational 
empirical work on the subject, followed by a set of empirical tests. In the third section, we 
briefly review studies focused on the United States and then conduct our own tests. A 
speculative conclusion explores possible extensions of the argument. 
 
I. Theory 
A theoretical maximum of power concentration is achieved when a single individual or ruling 
group makes all important policy decisions in a polity. A theoretical minimum is harder to define. 
Taking the existence of political elites as a given, we shall say that this ideal is achieved in a 
setting where power is widely dispersed, where numerous actors hold effective vetoes, and 
where rulers are compelled to abide by these limitations (e.g., by constitutional provisions that 
cannot easily be changed and are enforced by an active judiciary). Henceforth, near-synonyms 
                                                
1 In micro-communities (e.g., bands, villages, neighborhoods, city-states) citizens may implement some form of 
direct democracy (Raaflaub, Ober & Wallace 2007) or rely on informal, non-institutionalized mechanisms to reach 
decisions (Ostrom 1990). Here, power is apt to be highly diffuse for the simple reason that face-to-face networks 
are convenient and there is little need to concentrate authority in the hands of a single leadership group. 
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such as centralization, concentration, and consolidation, and antonyms such as decentralization, 
de-concentration, diffusion, dispersion, and fragmentation, will be used interchangeably. All are 
understood to refer to the overall concentration/dispersion of power in a polity.  
So defined, our topic intersects with, and to some extent subsumes, adjoining topics 
such as constitutional federalism (Filippov, Ordeshook & Shvetsova 2004; Riker 1964; Watts 
1998), regionalism and multilevel governance (Hooghe, Marks & Schakel 2010), local 
governance (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006), fiscal federalism (Boadway & Shah 2009; Gadenne 
& Singhal 2014; Oates 1972; Rodden 2005), public administration (Dubois & Fattore 2009), 
separate powers (Vile 1967/1998), veto points (Tsebelis 2002), devolution (O’Neill 2000), 
delegation (Mookherjee 2006), direct and indirect rule (Gerring et al. 2011), 
consensus/majoritarian institutions (Lijphart 1999), and the size of states (Alesina & Spolaore 
1997, 2003; Alesina, Perotti & Spolaore 1995; Bolton & Roland 1997; Colomer 2007; Lake & 
O’Mahony 2004; Wittman 1991, 2000). Each of these topics is in some respects unique, 
justifying the focused approach taken by extant work. Yet, there is also considerable semantic 
and empirical overlap across these concepts. Indeed, they are difficult to disentangle.  
Consider the distinction between vertical concentration (e.g., between higher and lower 
levels of government) and horizontal concentration (i.e., between political bodies at a single level 
of government). While useful for many purposes this distinction is not entirely clear-cut, as the 
two dimensions of power tend to intermingle (Hueglin & Fenna 2006). Let us consider a few 
examples. First, constitutional federalism is almost invariably combined with a second legislative 
chamber whose goal is to represent subnational polities (aka states, territories, or provinces), 
and whose representation is usually asymmetric with the lower house, generating a 
consequential division between the two chambers. Second, separate powers at the national level 
– between the executive and legislature – probably reinforce federalism, while federalism 
reinforces separate powers (Cameron & Falleti 2005: 257; Eaton 2004: 20-22). Third, both 
separate powers and federalism enhance the development of judicial review (Whittington 2009), 
and judicial review may help to entrench separate powers and federalism (Johnston 1969). More 
generally, it may be argued that divisions between branches at the national level enhance the 
power of subnational political forces, while powerful subnational forces enhance divisions at 
the national level. Vertical and horizontal fragmentation is mutually constitutive. From this 
perspective, and because of our quest for a unified theory, it seems appropriate to treat vertical 
and horizontal dimensions as manifestations of a single latent concept.  
Although we strive for an encompassing definition of power concentration we do not 
intend to envelope the adjacent concept of regime-type. Democracy, we shall assume, may be 
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achieved in highly concentrated polities (e.g., the United Kingdom, until quite recently) or 
highly de-concentrated systems (e.g., the United States). Likewise, undemocratic polities may be 
concentrated (e.g., the French and Spanish empires and contemporary North Korea) or de-
concentrated (e.g., the British and Ottoman Empires and contemporary China). Of course, we 
recognize that the nature of a regime affects the degree to which power can be concentrated or 
de-concentrated at any given point in time. There are also important interactions between 
institutions that structure regimes and institutions that structure power concentration, 
complicating our ability to test arguments focused on the latter. These difficulties 
notwithstanding, regime-type serves as a background condition – not a constitutive element – 
of power concentration. We assume the causes of regime-type are not identical to the causes of 
concentration. 
Causes 
Extant research on our topic is focused mostly on the vertical dimension of power – especially 
constitutional federalism and fiscal federalism2 – and on proximal causes of centralization, e.g., 
the dynamics of party competition, the interplay between national and subnational elites, and 
economic crisis (e.g., Benz & Broschek 2013; Crémer & Palfrey 1999; Dickovick 2011; Eaton & 
Dickovick 2004; Falleti 2005, 2010; Grossman & Lewis 2014; Manor 1999; Montero & Samuels 
2004; O’Neill 2005; Strøm & Graham 2014; Wibbels 2006).  
While proximal factors are obviously important, we should not lose sight of less visible 
distal factors that may be operating beneath the surface. This includes technology 
(communications, transport, military), geography, economic development, urbanization, 
inequality, globalization, external threats (including outright war), colonial heritage, 
ethnocultural diversity, and regime-type (Arzaghi & Henderson 2005; Dickovick 2011; Eaton & 
Dickovick 2004; Garrett & Rodden 2003; Gibler 2010; Hooghe & Marks 2013; Hooghe, Marks 
& Schakel 2010; Letelier 2005; Manor 1999; Strøm & Graham 2014; Veliz 1980; Wibbels 2005). 
We suspect that most of these factors are limited in purview: they may affect some aspects of 
power concentration but not others. Some evidence will be offered for this conjecture, though 
it is not our goal to comprehensively assess all possible influences on this outcome.3 
                                                
2 A good deal of the literature on vertical concentration is concerned with what has been labeled the assignment 
problem, i.e., the appropriate allocation of specific duties and responsibilities across levels of government. Our 
concern is not with who does what (specifically) but rather with the overall concentration or dispersion of power in 
a polity. 
3 We assume that ideational factors are pervasive. De-concentrated political institutions are more likely to be 
instigated and reproduced when actors believe they provide better governance, and the popularity of 
decentralization has waxed and waned over the past century, influencing the spread – and now, perhaps, the 
retraction – of decentralization initiatives (Manor 1999). However, to say that actors are responsive to ideas offers 
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Our goal is to home in on one distal cause that, we conjecture, is fairly universal, 
namely, the size of a polity, understood as the number of permanent residents within its 
boundaries.4 This provides the foundation for a general theory of power concentration. Before 
sketching that theory it is important to appreciate the changing historical role of size as a 
limiting condition of politics. 
In the pre-modern era, population and power concentration were, by most accounts, 
strongly correlated (Downing 1992; Ember 1963; Ember, Ember & Russett 1997; Feinman 
2011; Gledhill, Bender & Larsen 1988; McIntosh 1999; Stevenson 1968; Vengroff 1976).5 Large 
states and empires were highly concentrated (taking into account technological constraints 
operating at the time), and smaller bands and tribes less so. The reasons for this may be briefly 
reviewed, building on the literature cited above. First, the establishment of concentrated 
authority was critical to the rise of civilization, including population growth. Second, a large 
population fueled the concentration of the state apparatus by providing opportunities for 
revenue extraction, including forced labor. Third, populations were generally incorporated and 
controlled by military force, so a synergy existed between control and size – with strong states 
gaining population and weak states losing population. For all these reasons, size and power 
concentration were inseparable through most of human history, though it would be 
complicated to sort out cause and effect. (Presumably, they influenced each other in a reciprocal 
fashion, as suggested by this short explanatory sketch.)  
In recent times, due to developments in technology, ideology, and political organization, 
relationships between state and society have changed in fundamental ways. First, the 
demographic transition plays out in ways that are difficult for states to control. It is no longer 
the case that centralized governance paves the way for population growth; if anything, it is the 
reverse.6 Second, state boundaries, once fluid, are now fairly rigid. Once a state gains 
international recognition its borders tend to remain fairly static through time. Inter-state 
conflict, though persistent, does not usually result in a dramatic realignment of borders (Zacher 
2001). This means that the longstanding association between militarily strong – and presumably 
highly concentrated – states and expanding territory no longer exists, or barely exists. Even 
                                                                                                                                                 
an explanation that is nearly circular. A better explanation would reveal the prior causes of those ideas. Our 
hypothesis focuses on the size of a polity. 
4 An early formulation of this theory, focused on territory rather than population, can be found in Dahl & Tufte 
(1973: 40). 
5 Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson (2013) reaffirm this classical view, though they argue that Africa does not fit the 
mold. Note that the classical view is often focused on population density, whereas our focus is on total population. 
However, most of the arguments about density also apply to population. 
6 While aggressive population policies – either pro-natalist or anti-natalist – are fairly common, many 
demographers view such efforts as having only a marginal influence on the long-run growth of populations (Childs 
et al. 2005; van de Kaa 2006). 
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weak states survive (Diehl & Goertz 1992; Jackson & Rosberg 1982). Third, border changes, 
when they do occur, generally follow a logic of fission or fusion among peoples rather than the 
naked expropriation of territory by states. When borders realign it is usually with the approval, 
and often the connivance, of populations on the ground. People choose states, in addition to 
states choosing people.7  
These historic transformations in the relationship of states and populations suggest that 
demographic factors may now serve as a largely exogenous force in political development, and 
that the direction of that influence may be very different in the modern era.8 We argue that a 
polity’s institutions are affected by the population that it has, or aspires to have (if the polity is 
not yet formed or is at a re-founding juncture). The larger the polity, the more fragmented its 
institutional design.  
By way of entrée, let us consider an example of nested polity types: (1) United Nations 
(global), (2) European Union (supra-national), (3) France (national), (4) Midi-Pyrenees 
(regional), (5) Haute-Garonne (departmental), (6) Toulouse Métropole (metropolitan), and (7) 
Toulouse (commune). Because these governing units are nested within each other we can 
compare political organization across levels, holding constant some of the historical and cultural 
factors that might be expected to influence constitutional choices. A glance at our exemplars 
suggests that power at top levels is fairly diffuse, with numerous limitations on the exercise of 
executive power and most consequential decisions reserved for lower levels. Power at bottom 
levels is more concentrated, with fewer horizontal or vertical constraints.9 
Of course, polities at lower levels face constraints from above – France is constrained 
by the EU just as Toulouse (commune) is constrained by Toulouse Metropole. However, our 
theory pertains to the internal organization of polities, not external constraints. One must also 
appreciate that comparisons across levels of government are fraught with complications since 
each level carries a different constitutional mandate, and some of the institutional features of 
interest to us may derive from those differing mandates. That is why most of the analyses to 
                                                
7 At one point or another in history, migration accounts for the original inhabitants of all areas of the world except 
East Africa (the generally acknowledged point of origin of the human species). Our concern is with migration 
occurring over the past two centuries and its possible association with the outcomes of interest. A recent study of 
this subject finds that states exercised little control over their citizens’ comings-and-goings until the contemporary 
era, at which point democracies began to limit in-migration while autocracies limited out-migration. The net effect 
is a shift of citizens from democracies to autocracies (Breunig, Cao & Luedtke 2012). It is unclear whether the 
numbers involved are sufficient to impact the causal analyses presented in the following section. To the extent that 
it might, the impact of migration seems to run counter to our hypothesis and thus makes any positive effect of 
population on power diffusion/constraints less likely. 
8 This fits with a growing body of work that regards demography as a moving force of history (Goldstone et al. 
2011). 
9 Fodder for this gross generalization may be found in Cole (2010: 307), Loughlin (2007), Loughlin et al. (2001). 
[To scour] 
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follow in the empirical section of this study focus on comparisons across the same type of polity. 
Nonetheless, it is consistent with our theory that variations across different levels of 
government usually correspond to variations in power concentration. The largest polities tend 
to be the least centralized; the smallest polities are generally the most centralized. 
A schematic illustration of the theorized relationship between size and concentration is 
provided in Figure 1. Here, we visualize three exemplars, where the size of each shape indicates 
the size of its population. The large polity features many independent power centers – three at 
the top tier, thirteen at the second tier, and twenty-three at the lowest tier. The medium-sized 
polity features just two tiers, with just two independent power centers at the top tier and twelve 
at the bottom tier. The small polity has no independent power centers and is thus highly 
concentrated. The modular quality of Figure 1 corresponds neatly to our theory – though it 
must be stressed that this is a highly stylized representation. 
Figure 1:  Schematic Rendering of Polity Size and Concentration 
 
 
Large Polity: De-Concentrated 
 
                       
                       
                       
 
 
Medium-sized Polity: Semi-Concentrated 
 
                        
                        
 
 
Small Polity: Concentrated 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
To explain the apparent connection between demography and institutions we identify 
two likely causal mechanisms – efficiency and trust. In sketching out these mechanisms we 
consider the dynamic that obtains when the population of a polity grows while other conditions 
remain the same. In this setting we surmise that leaders face pressure to place limits on the 
Subdivisions within a polity represent independent power centers, organized vertically and horizontally. 
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exercise of power, either by fragmenting power at the center (horizontal de-concentration) 
and/or devolving power from center to periphery (vertical de-concentration). Sometimes, these 
institutional reforms are undertaken in an explicit and intentional fashion, e.g., by statute or 
constitutional reform. At other times they occur unobtrusively, perhaps even without notice. 
Efficiency 
The size of a polity affects the relative efficiency of different organizational forms (Hooghe & 
Marks 2013). Because of its larger tax base, as well as presumed economies of scale, a large 
polity can afford to develop highly de-concentrated political and administrative structures 
staffed with well-trained personnel. More importantly, the complexity of tasks facing a large 
polity may require a more diffuse structure of decisionmaking and implementation. Note that 
larger populations are generally more heterogeneous. Heterogeneity is manifested in the cultural 
sphere, i.e., in core values, ways of life, languages, religions, ethnicities, and so forth. It is also 
manifested in the economic sphere, as larger populations are likely to generate more diverse 
economies and hence a greater variety of sectors, occupations, and social strata. We shall 
assume that heterogeneity – cultural and/or economic – enhances the challenges of governance. 
Informational inputs are a lot more complicated and one-size-fits all solutions are unlikely to be 
very satisfactory. From this perspective, de-concentration is not simply a luxury afforded to a 
larger polity but also a functional necessity. 
Work across many disciplines suggests that the size of a unit enhances its complexity, 
and complexity stimulates greater specialization (aka division of labor). Research has identified 
such a relationship in sociobiology, where it is found at the level of individual organisms as well 
as animal societies (Bonner 1988, 2004; Jeanson et al. 2007), in human economies and societies 
(Carneiro 1967; Durkheim 1893/1964; Smith 1776), in firms (Chandler 1962; Chaney & Ossa 
2013; Penrose 1959), and in professional associations (Campbell & Akers 1970). It seems 
plausible that the same law might hold true for polities, where the size of a community 
enhances the complexity of governance tasks. Leaders must gather information on citizens, 
synthesize that information into the decisionmaking process, and then implement appropriate 
policies. With a larger population there are more people to monitor, to comprehend, to rule, 
and a greater number of demands to process (even if leaders are concerned only with stability 
and not with representing the interests of their constituents).  
  Of course, greater specialization, by itself, does not mandate de-concentration of power. 
(Consider insect colonies, primate colonies, and many pre-modern polities.) However, in the 
modern era, and in human societies, there is good reason to suppose that specialization and de-
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concentration go hand in hand. Research on firms suggests that this is the case (Bloom, Sadun 
& Van Reenen 2012; Miller 1992: ch 4), and the same dynamics may also apply on a broader 
scale to polities. Miller (1992: 79) points out that “even the most autocratic executives find that 
they must depend on subordinates with the knowledge of ‘particular circumstances of time and 
place.’ This information monopoly…makes necessary some degree of delegation or sharing of 
decision-making authority.” Arguably, there are few benefits to specialization unless 
accompanied by a degree of policymaking autonomy. Vertical and horizontal deconcentration 
ensures that administrators possess the local knowledge they need to make the right decisions 
and can make adjustments to those decisions as needed (Hooghe & Marks 2013). 
  It follows that as a population grows leaders may be obliged to institute a division of 
labor among administrators and/or elected officials, with different bodies having jurisdiction 
over different policies and/or different peoples. Horizontal de-concentration involves the 
development of different institutions to serve different functions (e.g., executive, legislative, and 
judicial) or constituencies – e.g., native courts and colonial courts, as in the classic modality of 
indirect rule (Lange 2009; Morris 1972), laws that apply differentially to citizens of diverse faiths 
(Waldron 2002), and so forth. Vertical de-concentration is practicable wherever preferences, 
values, and identities are geographically aligned. Here, Pareto optimal outcomes may be attained 
by devolving power to subnational bodies (Alesina et al. 1995: 754; Besley & Coate 2003; 
Bolton & Roland 1997: 1057-58; Breuss 2004: 40; Hooghe & Marks 2013: 181; Musgrave 1959; 
Oates 1972; Rubinchik-Pessach 2005). Note that vertical de-concentration is efficient only if 
externalities across regions are limited. Here, too, size also makes a contribution, as a larger 
subnational grouping is more likely to internalize costs and benefits (Hooghe & Marks 2013: 
181; Oates 2005, 357). It is therefore easier to decentralize power without introducing negative 
externalities in a large polity than in a small polity. 
Trust 
Efficiency is assessed according to material metrics of wellbeing, e.g., income, health, education, 
infrastructure, and the like. Trust engages a different dimension and calls forth somewhat 
different demands on government. Note that the problem of trust cannot be solved simply by 
adjusting policy outputs, and often runs contrary to considerations of efficiency.  
Trust engages questions of security and respect, i.e., non-tangible goods. Trust is also 
forward looking; it concerns actions that may (or may not) be taken in the future. When a group 
distrusts government it means that they are anxious about what that government might do next. 
Concentrated bodies, by their very nature, are incapable of achieving credible commitment to 
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policies that they might pursue in the future (North & Weingast 1989). As such, the problem of 
trust augurs for institutional solutions, i.e., constraints on the center that cannot be easily 
overcome, regardless of who happens to control the executive. 
Research suggests that feelings toward government are affected by the size of 
government. “Big government” (understood here as a unit that rules over large masses of 
people) is distrusted while “small government” (a unit that rules over a small, and presumably 
local, group of people) is trustworthy. Consequently, local institutions are generally more 
trusted than regional institutions, regional institutions are more trusted than national 
institutions, and national institutions are more trusted than supra-national institutions (Berezina 
& Diez-Medrano 2008; Nielsen 1981). Likewise, trust in large states is lower than in small states 
(Matsubayashi 2007; Turner 2011), and across localities with identical functions larger localities 
garner lower trust than smaller localities (Denters 2002). Size is also inversely correlated with 
political participation, efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy (Hansen 2014; Lassen & 
Serritzlew 2011; Oliver 2000; Remmer 2010; Weldon 2006) – features that we presume are 
correlated with political trust. In sum, a body that stands closer in proximity to the citizen is apt 
to be trusted more than one that stands afar, all other things being equal.10 
A polity need not be responsive or in any respect democratic in order for considerations 
of trust to come into play. Even when state elites are not inclined to implement citizen demands 
they must be cognizant of the costs of maintaining a form of political organization that is not 
perceived as legitimate. Illegitimacy may result in lax observance of the laws, tax avoidance, 
refusal of military service, and at the limit, secession – costs that even the most authoritarian 
ruler is obliged to reckon with. 
By way of illustration, let us consider an oft-noted dynamic in the founding or reform of 
polities. Here, fissiparous groups may be granted a share of power, a guarantee of rights, or a 
constitutional settlement that assures their rights, as a condition of their agreement to join (or 
remain within) a larger polity (Arzaghi & Henderson 2005; Lijphart 1977; Riker 1964; Stepan 
                                                
10 the lack of trust accorded to distant rulers in a centralized policy might be understood as a rational response to 
uncertainty; if one cannot assure that one’s policy preferences will be respected it is logical to demand a devolution 
of power to those who are more likely to share one’s policy preferences, or whose actions can be more effectively 
monitored and controlled. Or, there may be a primordial connection between polity size and legitimacy deeply 
rooted in human evolution, and therefore not a purely rational response to uncertainty. Arguably, the roots of 
group identity and corresponding suspicion of perceived outsiders is sociobiological insofar as evolutionary 
pressures favor cooperation among small groups that are geographically separated from one another (Hamilton 
1964; Olsson, Ebert, Banaji & Phelps 2005). If so, the norm of “self-rule” is as old as group identity and follows 
logically from the latter. Note that local rule usually corresponds to rule by people who are perceived to be “like 
us,” while distant rule corresponds to rule by people who are classified as “them.” A third possibility is that the 
norm of self-rule, evidenced by the rise of ethno-nationalism as a global ideology, is a response to modernity and 
therefore neither purely rational (in the narrow sense of maximizing utility) nor sociobiological (Gellner 1983; 
Hechter 2009: 292; Kedourie 1960). 
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1999). In this manner, vertical or horizontal de-concentration serves as a pre-condition for the 
birth or survival of a polity. Of course, changes to the structure of a polity are not always based 
on threats of dissolution. Many changes, especially those that do not involve constitutional 
features of a polity, occur in an incremental fashion and are scarcely perceptible except over 
long periods of time. This would include levels of revenue and expenditure and other more 
nuanced measures of relative power (see Sections II-III). Insofar as demography functions as a 
cause of anything at a macro-level it is often a subtle relationship, more apparent in 
spreadsheets than in newspaper headlines or history texts. Even so, the highly visible, macro-
level negotiations noted above may be indicative of a pervasive political dynamic, one that 
affects power negotiations at every level. 
 
II. Cross-Country Analyses 
While the relationship of size to democracy is a storied topic (Anckar 2008; Dahl & Tufte 1973; 
Gerring et al. 2015; Ott 2000; Veenendaal 2013), the relationship of size to political 
concentration is less often attended to. Five recent crossnational studies attempt to probe this 
relationship with non-negligible samples (Arzaghi & Henderson 2005; Garrett & Rodden 2003; 
Hooghe & Marks 2013; Panizza 1999; Treisman 2006). Among these studies, country samples 
vary from 39 to 66 (with an average of 52), temporal coverage varies from 3 to 57 years (with an 
average of about 7), and four outcomes are considered – government consumption, 
constitutional federalism, regional authority, and fiscal decentralization – as summarized in 
Table 1.  
Table 1:  Recent Crossnational Studies 
Study Countries Period Outcome Size Finding 
Arzaghi & Henderson 
2005 48 1975-1995 
Gov consumption Population + Territory 0 
Federalism Population 0 Territory + 
Garrett & Rodden 2003 47 1982-1989 Fiscal decentralization 
Population 0 
Territory + 
Hooghe & Marks 2013 39 1950-2006 Regional authority Population + Territory 0 
Panizza 1999 60 1975-1985 Fiscal decentralization 
Population 0 
Territory + 
Treisman 2006 66 1993-95 Fiscal decentralization 
Population 0 
Territory + 
MEAN or TOTAL  52 6.6 4 Population 2/6 Territory 4/6 
 
Units of analysis:  countries or country-years.  Countries/Period:  refers to the largest sample in which population or 
land area is included as part of the analysis.  Finding: size is correlated with dispersed power in a cross-sectionally 
dominated analysis (+) or not (0).  
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All five studies test both population and territory as predictors of de-concentration. 
These measures are transformed by the natural logarithm in accordance with the well-
established notion that their impact on various outcomes depreciates in a sub-linear fashion. 
Most analyses are cross-sectionally dominated, as the variables of interest tend to be sluggish 
and offer few opportunities for through-time analysis. (Where authors include both, we focus 
on the cross-sectional analysis.) Territory fares better as a predictor of de-concentration, 
achieving statistical significance and robustness (in various specification tests) in 4 out of 6 
analyses, as shown in the final columns of Table 1. Population is vindicated in only 2 out of 6 
analyses.  
One must bear in mind that the chosen samples in these studies are relatively small and 
centered on the OECD, and thus un-representative of the universe of nation-states. Likewise, 
only four measures of de-concentration are tested, a rather meager representation of this vast – 
and difficult-to-operationalize – subject. Note that constitutional federalism can be defined and 
measured in many different ways; as a result, extant measures demonstrate little convergent 
validity (Blume & Voigt 2011). Fiscal decentralization, as measured by the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics, leaves aside the question of autonomy (are local revenue raisers able to set 
their own rates and spend money in ways they see fit?)11 Moreover, none of the studies 
reviewed in Table 1 address the possible causes of horizontal concentration. 
Outcomes 
In situations where individual measures of a concept are problematic it makes sense to draw on 
multiple measures. We regard this as a form of triangulation. If a relationship demonstrates 
persistence across many indicators, measurement error is less worrisome. Broadening the 
empirical field should also make the theory more falsifiable, as it has more chances to fail. 
Additionally, we may be able to provide clues to the probable scope of the theory. For all these 
reasons, a wide-angle approach seems worthwhile. 
Our analysis encompasses all facets of power concentration, including both horizontal 
and vertical dimensions, so long as they can be measured reliably across a large number of 
countries (100+), representing all regions of the world. Where multiple indicators purport to 
measure the same concept, we choose that indicator in which we have greatest confidence 
and/or which offers the most extensive coverage.  
In this fashion, we arrive at a set of nineteen measures. Many are derived from the 
recently completed Varieties of Democracy project (“V-Dem”; Coppedge et al. 2015). Others 
                                                
11 For further discussion see Gadenne & Singhal (2014), Hooghe & Marks (2013), Rodden (2004). 
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are constructed from the Comparative Constitutions Project (“CCP”; Elkins, Ginsburg & 
Melton 2009), the Database of Political Institutions (“DPI”; Beck et al. 2001), the Political 
Constraints index (“PolCon”; Henisz 2002), Government Finance Statistics (“GFS”; 
International Monetary Fund), World Development Indicators (“WDI”; World Bank various 
years), and Centripetalism (Gerring & Thacker 2008). Readers are referred to these sources for 
in-depth discussion of coding procedures and sources. One variable is constructed from original 
data collection by the authors, as described below. 
The first set of indicators focuses primarily on vertical concentration (i.e., 
centralization). Federalism is understood as an institutionalized division or sharing of 
responsibilities between a national authority and semiautonomous regional units, usually 
codified in a constitution. Following Gerring & Thacker (2008: 88), polities are coded 0 if they 
are nonfederal (regional governments, if they exist, are granted minimal policy-making power), 1 
if they are semifederal (there are elective governments at the regional level but constitutional 
sovereignty is reserved to the national government), or 2 if they are fully federal (elective 
regional governments plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority). Subnational 
government layers is comprised of two variables measuring whether (a) local or (b) regional 
governments exist, as coded by research assistants and regional experts enlisted by V-Dem. 
These are added together to form a three-level index: 0=none, 1=one level, or 3=both levels. 
Subnational elections measures the existence or non-existence of elections at subnational levels, as 
coded by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Autonomous regions measures the 
existence/nonexistence of regions enjoying substantial autonomy from the national 
government, as coded by the DPI. Revenue decentralization is subnational revenue considered as 
share of total public revenue, based on the GFS and compiled by Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya 
(2007). Government consumption includes all (central) government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services, including payment of employees and most expenditures on 
national defense and security (but not those considered part of government capital formation), 
considered as a share of GDP, as compiled by the WDI.12  
A second set of indicators focuses primarily on horizontal concentration at national 
levels. Separate powers is coded as 1 if the dominant executive (either the head of state or head of 
government) is directly elected, 0 otherwise, based on coding by research assistants enlisted by 
the V-Dem project. Divided party control measures the extent to which a single party or coalition 
                                                
12 Because this variable focuses on the central government it offers an informative measure of the extent to which 
that government is able to extract resources and control the economy (Arzaghi & Henderson 2005; Oates 1972). 
Though it does not focus explicitly on decentralization it complements our measure of revenue decentralization, 
offering superior coverage across countries and through time. 
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controls both the executive and legislative branches of national government, based on coding 
by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Decentralized parties measures how 
decentralized the process of candidate selection for the national legislature is – specifically, the 
extent to which national party leaders control the process or share power with constituents and 
local and regional party actors, as judged by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project.13 
Judicial review attempts to judge whether any court in the judiciary has the legal authority to 
invalidate governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on 
the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision, as coded by country experts enlisted for 
the V-Dem project. Constitution length records the number of words in the constitution, as 
recorded by the CCP. Constitution scope judges the scope of a constitution based on the 
proportion of selected issues that are covered, following standard CCP categories. Constitution 
rigidity measures the number of actors required to approve constitutional amendments, 
according to the constitution, as coded by the CCP.14 Bicameralism measures the existence of two 
chambers in the national legislature and – if they exist – how closely matched their powers are, 
based on the coding of country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. (If one chamber 
overshadows the other we regard this as an example of weak bicameralism.) Legislative committees 
measures whether the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature has a functioning 
committee system and, if so, whether they are permanent (or special) and whether they have a 
strong influence on the course of policymaking, as coded by experts enlisted for the V-Dem 
project. Legislative fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly drawn 
representatives from the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature will be from different 
parties, as measured by the PolCon dataset. Political constraints refers to “the extent to which a 
change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy” (Henisz 
2002: 363), taking into account the number of independent branches of government and the 
preferences of each of these branches, as measured by the PolCon dataset. Checks & balances 
refers to “the number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for whether these veto 
players are independent of each other, as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in 
a system, their respective party affiliations, and the electoral rules” (Beck et al. 2001), as 
measured by the DPI and transformed by the natural logarithm.  
                                                
13 Following a long tradition of work, we regard the structure of parties as a key element of centralization (Filippov, 
Ordeshook & Shvetsova 2004; Riker 1972; Rodden 2005; Samuels & Shugart 2010; Wibbels 2006; Willis, Garman 
& Haggard 1999), and candidate selection as a key influence on the relative centralization of parties (Gallagher & 
Marsh 1988). 
14 This measure of rigidity seems superior to others by virtue of offering significant variation across polities and 
strong country coverage. We do not regard actual constitutional changes as indicative of rigidity because of the 
confounding feature that more detailed constitutions – fostered by larger countries – are likely to need more 
frequent revision. 
 
 
17 
A final indicator, Capital city, encompasses both vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
power concentration. Here, we measure the population of the capital city in a polity as a share 
of that polity’s total population, transformed by the natural logarithm (Authors). This is 
regarded as a summary measure of concentration, following the assumption that in polities 
where power is concentrated both material resources and human resources will be concentrated 
at the center.15 Note that most of the tests that follow include a covariate measuring overall 
urbanization, so as not to confuse the status of the capital city with demographic conditions 
obtaining in the country at large. 
This set of nineteen indicators of concentration offers a broad – but certainly not 
comprehensive – survey of the topic. Note that virtually any feature of government may be 
viewed as indicative of power concentration; as such, our topic is unbounded. One might, for 
example, examine particular policy areas to gauge which actors are actively engaged in 
policymaking and, accordingly, how concentrated that policy-area is. Sophisticated efforts of 
this nature (e.g., Hooghe & Marks 2010; Hooghe et al. 2016) are limited in coverage and thus 
not relevant for present purposes. Nonetheless, there is no reason in principle why finely-honed 
indicators could not be expanded to include a broader sample of countries.16 
Summary features of the chosen outcomes are listed in Table 2. In addition to sources, 
we indicate coverage – number of countries, years, and observations – for each measure of 
concentration. We also show descriptive statistics – mean, standard deviation, and the scale of 
the index. Note that chosen indicators include a mix of continuous, left-censored, ordinal, and 
binary scales. All are re-scaled to 0-1 so that results can be easily compared. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
15 Galiani & Kim (2011: 128) comment: “First, government agencies and workers are concentrated in capital cities. 
Second, since governments make laws and redistribute income, capital cities may attract significant lobbying 
activity. To the extent that political corruption or rent-seeking behavior contributes to primacy, their impact is 
likely to be manifested in the growth of capital cities. Finally, capital cities may attract a disproportionate share of 
government resources for local infrastructure and amenities.” Note that previous work (Ades & Glaeser 1995; 
Henderson 2003) focused on the population of capital cities, which seems less useful for present purposes. 
16 One apparent omission deserves special mention. We do not regard electoral rules as having a predictable impact 
on centralization or decentralization. Note that district magnitude, probably the most important aspect of electoral 
law, has offsetting effects. Larger districts generally enhance the size of the party system but also enhance the role 
of national party elites in candidate selection. An increase in district magnitude thus decentralizes the party system 
while centralizing parties. Moreover, the impact of electoral laws is dependent upon contextual factors that are 
difficult to anticipate, and are open to change.  
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Table 2:  Outcome Measures and Estimation Strategies 
 Measure  Coverage  Descr ip t ion  Tes t s  
 Indicator Source Countries Years Obs Mean SD Scale Pooled Panel H 
1. Federalism Centripetalism 160 103 6,354 0.191 0.374 Ordinal O. logit  + 
2. Subnational gov. layers V-Dem 171 115 16,181 0.931 0.176 Ordinal O. logit  + 
3. Subnational elections V-Dem 172 115 16,212 0.638 0.291 Continuous OLS RE + 
4. Autonomous regions DPI 176 38 6,139 0.122 0.327 Binary Logit  + 
5. Revenue decentraliz. GFS 103 29 1,398 0.282 0.241 Continuous OLS RE + 
6. Gov. consumption WDI 176 51 6,638 0.188 0.092 Continuous OLS RE – 
7. Separate powers V-Dem 174 115 16,477 0.232 0.422 Binary Logit  + 
8. Divided party control V-Dem 174 115 16,106 0.549 0.266 Continuous OLS RE + 
9. Decentralized parties V-Dem 174 115 16,281 0.339 0.199 Continuous OLS  + 
10. Judicial review  V-Dem 174 115 16,403 0.543 0.293 Continuous OLS  + 
11. Constitution length CCP 197 225 960 0.031 0.080 Continuous OLS  + 
12. Constitution scope CCP 195 225 765 0.575 0.158 Continuous OLS  + 
13. Constitution rigidity CCP 191 225 906 0.318 0.265 Ordinal O. logit  + 
14. Bicameralism V-Dem 183 115 17,547 0.344 0.328 Continuous OLS  + 
15. Legislative committees V-Dem 172 115 12,106 0.533 0.173 Continuous OLS RE + 
16. Legislative fractionaliz. PolCon 156 213 8,504 0.477 0.289 Censored Tobit RE + 
17. Political constraints PolCon 165 213 14,808 0.220 0.290 Censored Tobit RE + 
18. Checks & balances DPI 177 38 6,004 0.246 0.229 Continuous OLS RE + 
19. Capital city Authors 186 111 19,895 0.509 0.120 Continuous OLS RE – 
 
All variables re-scaled from 0-1.  H:  hypothesized relationship to polity size.  O. logit: ordered logit.  RE: random effects. 
 
In the final columns of Table 2 we preview empirical tests to come. Following the 
distributions suggested by each scale, we adopt a variety of estimators in pooled regression tests. 
Ten of the chosen outcomes are suitable for panel analysis, which is to say there is a sufficiently 
long time-series with significant variation over time in the outcome of interest. These outcomes 
will be analyzed with a random effects estimator and a lagged dependent variable. Finally, Table 
2 notes the hypothesized relationship of polity size to the chosen indicator. Measures of 
concentration (Government consumption and Capital city) are expected to be negatively 
correlated with polity size, while measures of dispersion (all others) are expected to be positively 
correlated. 
Appendix A includes a number of additional descriptive analyses pertaining to the 
chosen outcomes. Table A3 shows that they are generally (but not always) correlated with one 
another in the expected direction. A principal components analysis, shown in Table A4, shows 
the first component explains only a small portion (about a fourth) of the variance. (For this 
reason, attempting to reduce the information contained these indicators to a smaller number of 
dimensions based on some version of factor analysis seems impracticable.) Evidently, these 
nineteen indicators are capturing multiple dimensions of the underlying concept. This sets a 
high bar to empirical confirmation. It is plausible that a single variable may be correlated by 
accident with multiple highly correlated outcomes. It is less likely that a single predictor will be 
correlated by accident with multiple weakly correlated outcomes. 
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Tests 
In Table 3, we summarize a broad array of tests focused on population as a predictor of power 
concentration. To economize, we show estimates only for the key variable of theoretical interest 
– population (logged). Each cell thus represents a separate regression analysis – 175 in all. 
Complete results from these tests are included in Appendix B and further information on 
definitions, coding, and sources for covariates can be found in Table A1.  
Table 3:  Cross-country Tests of Power Concentration 
Analys i s  Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Populat ion  t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample  Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Vertical          
1.Federalism 1.028*** 0.362*** 1.126*** 0.986** 0.834** 0.732*** 0.277*** 1.097***  0.643*** (0.310) (0.129) (0.307) (0.400) (0.330) (0.282) (0.068) (0.328)  (0.119) 
2.Subnational  
   gov layers 
0.546** 0.513*** 0.789* 0.331 0.353 1.289* 0.335*** 0.477*  0.026** 
(0.271) (0.110) (0.416) (0.282) (0.233) (0.711) (0.093) (0.256)  (0.010) 
3.Subnational  
   elections 
0.037*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.028** 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.003*** 0.038*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012) 
4.Autonomous  
   regions 
0.555** 0.496*** 0.482* 0.718** 0.419* 0.687 0.404*** 0.543*  0.170 
(0.267) (0.151) (0.255) (0.296) (0.225) (0.456) (0.113) (0.286)  (0.138) 
5.Revenue  
   decentraliz. 
0.080*** 0.048*** 0.073*** 0.099*** 0.069*** 0.033*** 0.010*** 0.083*** 0.005*** 0.123*** 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.021) 
6.Government  
    consumpt. 
-0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.005 -0.010*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.009** -0.001** -0.014*** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) 
Horizontal         
7.Separate  
   powers 
0.416*** 0.192*** 0.357** 0.314* 0.269** 0.373** 0.086 0.541**  0.174* 
(0.139) (0.070) (0.165) (0.161) (0.114) (0.177) (0.065) (0.227)  (0.091) 
8.Divided 
   party control 
0.023** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.024** 0.045** 0.005* 0.029*** 0.002** 0.017 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.013) 
9.Decentraliz 
   parties 
0.026*** 0.021** 0.025** 0.022** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.010*** 0.030***  0.021** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009)  (0.009) 
10.Judicial  
     review 
0.021* 0.022** 0.018 0.006 0.020* 0.021* 0.012*** 0.027**  0.025* 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012)  (0.014) 
11.Constitut. 
     length 
0.000*** 0.000 0.000***  0.000*  -0.000 0.000**  -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) 
12.Constitut. 
     scope 
0.022*** 0.012* 0.020***  0.012*  0.006*** 0.026***  0.001 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.002) (0.009)  (0.008) 
13.Constitut. 
      rigidity 
0.216*** 0.024 0.051  0.155*  0.029 0.262***  -0.054 
(0.073) (0.045) (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.018) (0.099)  (0.082) 
14.Bicameral- 
     ism 
0.061*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.019*** 0.078*** 0.005*** 0.054*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.013) 
15.Legislative 
     committees 
0.027*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.001*** 0.024*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) 
16.Legislative  
     fractionaliz 
0.021* 0.017 0.023*** 0.015 0.022* 0.047*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.002* -0.002 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) 
17.Political  
     constraints 
0.037*** 0.077** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.029* 0.065*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.002** -0.024 
(0.002) (0.031) (0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) 
18.Checks &  
     balances 
0.022*** 0.008 0.015*** 0.032*** 0.022*** 0.035*** 0.014*** 0.017* 0.004*** 0.018* 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) 
Vertical/Horizontal          
19.Capital  
      City 
-0.033*** -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.000** -0.035*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) 
Covariates            
   Basic ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
   Additional   ü        
   Yt-1         ü  
 
Outcome measures of power concentration (re-scaled from 0-1) regressed against population (logged) and selected 
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covariates. Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, 
where population is measured in 1900.  Basic covariates: per capita GDP (logged), Urbanization, Legal origin 
dummies, Latitude, Muslim, Protestant, OPEC dummy, Region dummies, Year dummies.  (Year dummies are 
excluded from CCP outcomes – Constitution Length, Scope, Rigidity – because of collinearity.)  Additional 
covariates: Lexical index of electoral democracy, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  Yt-1: lagged outcome.  Electoral 
system dummies included in tests of Divided party control (row 8) only.  Coefficients and standard errors shown for 
population.  Estimators: ordinary least squares (for continuous outcomes), tobit (for left-censored outcomes), 
ordered logit (for ordinal outcomes), logit (for binary outcomes), random effects (for panel estimation in Model 9).  
Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  Model 
7: datasets imputed with Amelia.  Model 8: country-years in which multiparty elections are on course (Lexical>2).  
Model 9: panel analysis, conducted only with continuous outcomes that show substantial temporal variation. Model 
10: second-stage results of a two-stage analysis, where land area (logged) and arable land (%) serve as instruments 
for population. Complete results displayed in Appendix B. 
 
 
Units of analysis are country-years with right-side variables measured at t-1, unless 
otherwise noted. Estimators for pooled analyses include ordinary least squares for continuous 
outcomes, tobit for left-censored outcomes, ordered logit for ordinal outcomes, and logit for 
binary outcomes, as indicated in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by country. Several cells 
in Table 3 are empty, signaling that there are insufficient observations, or insufficient variation 
over time, to provide a meaningful test. 
Model 1, shown in the first column, tests a basic specification including per capita GDP 
(logged), Urbanization, Legal origin (dummies for English, French, German, Scandinavian, 
Socialist), Latitude (distance from equator, logged), Muslim (share of population), Protestant 
(share of population), OPEC (dummy), Region (dummies for Eastern Europe & Central Asia, 
Latin America, Middle East & North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe & North 
America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific, Caribbean), and Year (dummies for each year in the 
panel). Electoral system dummies (measuring a variety of electoral rules) are included in tests of 
Divided party rule, as this outcome is strongly affected by party system size. We shall regard this 
as our benchmark model since all of these factors have been identified as possible causes of 
concentration. Estimated coefficients for population are correctly signed and statistically 
significant (p<.10) in all of these tests.  
 Model 2 is a bivariate analysis in which a measure of concentration is regressed against 
population (logged). While this minimal specification may seem implausible it has the virtue of 
dispensing with post-treatment confounding – an important consideration in situations where 
covariates may be influenced by the causal factor of interest. Estimated coefficients for 
population are correctly signed for all outcomes in this simple model, and statistically significant 
(p<.10) in all but four. 
Model 3 builds on the benchmark model with the addition of two covariates often 
regarded as causes of (de)concentration: democracy, measured by the Lexical index of electoral 
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democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015), and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (the probability of two 
randomly chosen individuals belonging to the same ethnolinguistic group). Estimated 
coefficients for population are correctly signed in all tests and statistically significant (p<.10) in 
all but two tests. (These factors are excluded from the benchmark model because both regime-
type and ethnicity may be endogenous to polity size.) 
 Model 4 returns to the benchmark specification, this time lagging right-side variables 
fifty years (rather than a single year). To the extent that relationships persist, this reduces 
concerns about X:Y endogeneity and common-cause confounders, especially when – as in this 
case – the chosen lag is very far behind the outcome and the other predictors. Note that 
because the CCP variables are limited to discrete points in time they cannot be analyzed in this 
fashion and are therefore excluded. Estimated coefficients for population are correctly signed in 
all sixteen remaining tests and statistically significant (p<.10) in all but three. 
Model 5 takes this approach further, measuring population in 1900 while other right-
side variables are measured at t-1. Samples are therefore limited to the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. Since population is fixed at one point in time it cannot be affected by developments 
occurring later in the century, which might otherwise serve as confounders. Estimated 
coefficients for population are correctly signed in all of these tests and statistically significant 
(p<.10) in all but one. 
Model 6 continues to measure population in 1900 while measuring all other variables in 
2000. This purely cross-sectional analysis has the benefit of weighting all countries equally and – 
arguably – measuring outcomes at a point when they have moved closer to equilibrium. It also 
allows us to test the possibility of a very long-memoried causal relationship between 
demography and political structure. CCP variables are again excluded as they are not measured 
in 2000. Estimated coefficients for population are correctly signed in all sixteen tests and 
statistically significant (p<.10) in all but two. 
 Model 7 deals with potential bias arising from missing data by imputing full datasets 
utilizing the Amelia multiple-imputation algorithm (Honaker & King 2010). With an imputation 
model that takes into account the time-series cross-sectional nature of the data, we impute 
missing data for all variables and all sovereign countries beginning with the first year of 
observed data for each measure of power concentration. We then run each model on 20 
imputed data sets. Estimated coefficients for population are correctly signed in all but one test 
and statistically significant (p<.10) in all but three. In most cases, coefficient estimates are quite 
close to the benchmark model, suggesting that our sample is not systematically biased. 
 Model 8 restricts the analysis to country-years in which multiparty elections are on 
 
 
22 
course, as measured by the Lexical index of electoral democracy, where Lexical>2. This is a 
fairly low threshold, indicating the existence – but not the quality or competitiveness – of multi-
party elections for the legislature and executive. It is an important probe, nonetheless, as 
institutions may operate differently in democratic and autocratic contexts. In the event, 
estimated coefficients for population are correctly signed and statistically significant (p<.10) in 
all tests. They are also comparable to coefficients estimated for our benchmark model (Model 
2). Viewed alongside results for Model 3 (where Lexical serves as a covariate), this suggests that 
relationships between population and various measures of concentration are not dependent on 
regime-type, or only marginally so. 
Model 9 departs from our pooled regression approach by adopting a panel format. This 
format is viable only for outcomes that have registered significant changes during the observed 
time period, as discussed. For these ten outcomes, we adopt a random effects estimator and add 
a lagged dependent variable to the benchmark specification. Estimated coefficients for 
population are correctly signed and statistically significant (p<.10) in all of these tests. (Note 
that coefficients in a lagged dependent variable model measure the short-term effect of a 
change in population, and are therefore not directly comparable to coefficients estimated in 
other models.)  
 Model 10 provides an instrumental-variable analysis in which two factors are utilized as 
instruments: territory and arable land. Territorial expanse is measured by the land area of a polity 
(square kilometers), transformed by the natural logarithm. Arable land (as share of total land 
area) is measured in 1960, the first year for which broad coverage is available from the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (collated by the WDI). While it might be preferable to measure 
this factor in 1900, this statistic is extremely sluggish over the observable period (1960-2010), 
and we expect it to be equally sluggish in the previous historical period. By measuring this 
quantity at one point in time we are thus gaining a reasonably stable estimate of a country’s 
available agricultural resources across the 20th century.  
Encouragingly, territory and arable land together explain 75% of the variation in 
population (logged). However, to serve as viable instruments we must also assume that 
whatever effect territory and arable land have on power concentration operates through 
population and not through other channels, conditional on observed covariates. We must also 
assume that there is no reciprocal causation (from Y to X), and that there is no interference 
across units. Several potential problems deserve discussion. 
First, we consider the possibility that territory affects power concentration directly, 
rather than indirectly. This is explored in a set of analyses presented in Appendix E, where we 
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show that population generally outperforms territory as a predictor of power concentration. 
Empirically, territory behaves more like an indirect cause than a direct cause – though this of 
course does not rule out the possibility that in some instances, or to some degree, it may 
function as a direct cause. 
Second, one might be concerned that arable land influences modernization, which in 
turn may affect political structures. However, our model conditions on per capita GDP and 
urbanization, so this potential source of bias is presumably blocked.  
Third, it is possible that political structures affect the territory of a country, with highly 
concentrated states preferring larger countries (Alesina & Spolaore 2003: 69). There is no easy 
solution to this selection effect. However, to the extent that it affects the data generating 
process it introduces a conservative bias into the analysis, making it harder to reject the null.17 
Accordingly, estimates from this instrumental-variable analysis may be regarded as a lower 
bound. 
Fourth, many studies have noted that country boundaries are affected by international-
system factors such as economies of scale, burdens of heterogeneity, necessity of self-defense, 
the prominence of international trade, technological developments affecting transport, 
communications, warfare, and administration, and threats to sovereignty (Alesina & Spaolore 
2003; Hiscox & Lake 2001; Wittman 1991, 2000). However, because these factors affect all 
countries equally they lie orthogonal to our cross-country analysis. To the extent that 
international-system factors change over time their influence are captured by annual dummies in 
our models. 
A confusing element of our analysis is that the boundaries of countries are mutually 
constituted. A change in one country’s borders (in the modern era) affects another country’s 
borders, and hence its population. This violates a strict interpretation of the stable unit 
treatment value assumption (Rubin 2005). However, as noted, border changes are modest over 
the period under observation. Most polities in our dataset retain similar boundaries from the 
time of independence to the present-day. Limiting the analysis to the post-1960 period or to 
countries that have retained stable borders in that period (or since independence) has little 
impact on the results reported in this analysis.  
For these reasons, we regard the instrumental variable analysis shown in Model 10 of 
Table 3 as a highly plausible identification strategy. Estimated coefficients for population in this 
                                                
17 Insofar as (de)centralization is correlated with regime-type – decentralized regimes being more democratic – it is 
worth noting that there does not appear to be any causal relationship between regime-type and secession. Walter 
(2006) demonstrates that regime-type does not predict violent attempts at secession, and Sambanis & Milanovic 
(2009) find that economic factors, not regime type, predict calls for sovereignty in 48 economically decentralized 
states. 
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model are correctly signed in all tests, statistically significant (p<.10) in all but seven, and 
comparable to the benchmark in most instances. However, because this analysis depends upon 
assumptions that cannot be proven, and are certainly open to question, we regard Model 10 as a 
robustness test, not a primary identification strategy. 
Discussion 
Any single analysis using observational data at the country-level is open to skepticism. That is 
why we have enlisted a large number of empirical tests that incorporate multiple measures of 
power concentration, multiple specifications, and multiple estimators, including cross-sectional, 
panel estimators, and instrumental-variable estimators. Reassuringly, estimated coefficients for 
the key variable of theoretical interest are fairly stable across these tests, as shown in Table 3. 
(As noted, Model 9 is a dynamic model and hence not comparable to the results of pooled 
regressions shown elsewhere in Table 2.) 
 Granted, each of these nineteen outcomes could have been modeled differently, and we 
might have endeavored to provide a unique specification for each outcome. However, 
introducing novel features to each analysis would enhance the possibility of “just-so” 
specifications. By adopting a common framework we limit options for selecting covariates and 
estimators that support our favored thesis. In the event, the addition (or subtraction) of 
covariates, or of new estimators, is unlikely to change the overall pattern of findings, which 
seem consistent across a wide variety of settings. The balance of the evidence suggests that the 
population of a country impacts constitutional arrangements such that power is more dispersed 
when a polity is more populous. 
Is this effect significant in everyday (“real”) terms? To gauge the extent of this effect we 
construct a series of graphs showing predicted values for each outcome at different population 
levels based on our benchmark model (Model 2 in Table 3), as shown in Figures B1-B19. 
Where outcomes are ordinal or binary the estimated values reflect the probability of falling into 
the highest category in the index. Predicted values are bracketed by 95% confidence intervals, 
suggesting the variability of these estimates. Estimates are more precise near the left and center 
of the population distribution, as is to be expected – given that this is where most of the data is 
concentrated (there are many more small and medium-sized countries than large countries). At 
the bottom of each graph we list the minimum and maximum value and standard deviation for 
each outcome so the reader can judge how much variation might be accountable to 
demographic forces. Following our logarithmic scale, the impact of a given shift in population is 
much greater at lower population levels than at higher population levels. 
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The effects registered in these figures are not huge, but neither are they trivial. Size 
appears to affect the degree of power concentration in a polity, measured in many different 
ways. By contrast, none of the other structural factors tested in our models – including per 
capita GDP, urbanization, legal origin, latitude, Muslim, Protestant, OPEC, democracy, ethnic 
fractionalization, or region – is consistently related to concentration, as shown in Tables B1-
B19. Population appears to be the only generalizable (distal) cause. 
 
II. Within-Country Analyses 
Problems of causal inference often arise when nation-states form the primary units of analysis 
(Kittel 2006). For better identification strategies we turn to within-country tests. Institutional 
forms do not vary as much within countries as across countries, limiting our choice of outcome 
measures. Nonetheless, there is substantial variation in the degree to which power is 
concentrated within states, counties, and cities across the United States, and such variation as 
exists is less subject to confounding.  
 While many studies have exploited subnational variation in the US to understand the 
impact of (de)centralization on the quality of governance (e.g., Zax 1989), few have studied the 
sources of power concentration and only two studies explore the relationship with size. Wallis 
& Oates (1988) examines revenue decentralization across the fifty states and Clark (1968: 585) 
briefly reports on community structures across fifty-one localities. Results from these studies 
provide some support for our thesis, despite limitations in sample size and in the purview of 
outcomes surveyed. 
Tests 
In the analyses that follow, reported in Table 4, we explore institutional variation at state, 
county, and city levels. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table C1 and descriptive 
statistics in Table C2. As previously, all outcomes are re-scaled from 0-1 to facilitate 
comparisons. 
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Table 4:  Within-Country Tests 
Polities State County City 
Outcome 
 City-
county/ 
total 
expenditures 
City-
county/ 
total 
revenue  
Special 
purpose 
governments 
Independent 
school 
districts 
CSSO  
selection 
City/total 
expenditure 
City/total 
revenue 
Executive 
veto 
Executive 
term limit 
Mayor-
council 
Hypothesis + + + + + + + + + + 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full pop>50k 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population  0.104*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.028*** 1.713** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.212*** 0.460*** 0.380** 
   (ln) (0.018) (0.019) (0.030) (0.006) (0.626) (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.042) (0.193) 
Polities 51 51 51 51 51 3,153 3,153 7,503 7,503 2,225 
Years 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 
1942-
2012 2000 2000 
1986-
2011 
1986-
2011 
1986-
2011 
Obs 250 250 252 253 200 2,642 2,641 16,955 16,439 1,903 
R2 0.612 0.610 0.419 0.475 0.196 0.757 0.787 0.079 0.100 0.237 
 
Data drawn from states, counties, and cities in the United States.  Covariates for state-level analyses: Income per 
capita, urbanization, Democratic vote share, College, Unemployment, Minority (%), Region (dummies). Covariates 
for county-level analyses: Urbanization, Minority (%), Income per capita, Democratic vote, State (dummies).  
Covariates for city-level analyses: Urbanization, Black (%), Asian (%), Latino (%), Income per capita, County 
(dummies). County analyses are cross-sectional. State and city analyses represent a short panel, with standard errors 
clustered at the state and city level, respectively.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 
 
At the state level, we employ five measures of power concentration: city-county share of 
expenditures (Model 1), city-county share of revenue (Model 2), the number of special purpose 
governments (Model 3), the number of independent school districts (Model 4), and the method 
of selection for the Chief State School Officer (CSSO), which may be either appointive or 
elective (Model 5). Measures of fiscal decentralization are widely used in crossnational studies 
(see Table 1) as well as in studies focused on the United States (Wallis and Oates 1988; Xie et al. 
1998; Zax 1989). The number of special purpose governments and independent school districts 
is viewed as a key measure of political concentration in federalist systems (Foster 1993; 
Hammond et al. 2011; Nelson & Foster 1999). An elective CSSO presumably signals the 
independence of this official relative to other elected officials. All model specifications include a 
range of covariates that may affect power concentration, and may (plausibly) serve to block 
confounders: GDP per capita, urbanization, party control of state government, post-secondary 
education, unemployment, median household income, percent minority, and regional dummies 
(South, Northeast, Midwest, West).  
County-level analyses focus on revenue decentralization (Model 6) or expenditure 
decentralization (Model 7), i.e., fiscal instruments controlled by cities as a share of total city-
county revenue or expenditures. These specifications include covariates measuring urbanization, 
percent minority, income per capita, Democratic presidential vote, and state dummies.  
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At the city level, we are able to test three measures of power concentration. In Model 8 
we examine executive veto power – the ability of the top official (usually a mayor) to veto 
council legislation. In Model 9, we look at executive term limits, i.e., the imposition of any sort 
of term limit on the chief executive (usually a mayor). In Model 10, we focus on the choice of a 
mayor-council form of government – as opposed to a council-manager or commission format. 
Note that because very small cities often cannot afford to hire a city manager they may be 
constrained to adopt a mayor-council form of government where the mayor serves pro bono or 
for a nominal salary. This cost-constraint, which hinges on the willingness of elected officials to 
accept lower remuneration than appointed officials, lies outside the scope of our theory and has 
no plausible applicability to larger polities such as nation-states. Consequently, we limit the 
analysis in Model 10 to cities of at least 50,000 citizens. Data for city-level analyses are drawn 
from municipal surveys conducted by the International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA) over six years – 1986, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 – generating a short panel. 
Specifications include covariates measuring urbanization, percent black, Latino, and Asian, 
income per capita, and county dummies. This means that comparisons are being drawn across 
cities within the same county. To protect against serial correlation in this short panel standard 
errors are clustered by city.  
Analyses at all three levels support our contention that the size of a polity influences the 
way its institutions are structured, with larger polities developing less concentrated systems of 
rule. Judging by the estimated coefficients the effects are sizeable. For example, moving from a 
state with a population in the 25th percentile to a state with a population in the 75th percentile 
increases the probability of a directly elected CSSO by nearly 47 percent. Moreover, the impact 
of population on power concentration is consistent across all measured outcomes, as shown in 
Table 4. Indeed, population is the only variable among those tested in the foregoing models – 
including income, education, urbanization, minority share, and partisanship – that consistently 
predicts these outcomes in within-country analyses, as shown in Appendix D. 
 For a variety of reasons, which may now be summarized, we are fairly confident that the 
relationships depicted in Table 4 are causal. First, analyses below the state level enlist very large 
samples. Instead of 100+ nation-states we are able to draw upon 3,000+ counties and 7,000+ 
cities. This diminishes the possibility of stochastic error as well as problems of collinearity 
among right-side variables. Second, the possibility of X:Y endogeneity seems remote. Even if 
Tiebout sorting occurs, it is unlikely that varying levels of concentration across units have 
systematic effects on the quality of governance sufficient to stimulate widespread patterns of 
migration. Third, the borders of subnational units, while by no means random, are unlikely to 
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be affected by the outcome of interest, as they might be at national levels.18 Fourth, subnational 
units within a single country share many background characteristics, limiting the number of 
potential confounders. Ceteris paribus conditions are especially strong when comparing 
counties within a single state (using state fixed effects) or cities within a single county (using 
county fixed effects). Indeed, county- and city-level analyses are remarkably stable in the face of 
changes in specification, reflecting the large sample and the fact that covariates are not highly 
correlated with the variable of theoretical interest (population). Finally, the possibility of 
omitted confounders seems remote given that we have been able to measure, and condition on, 
many factors that might influence – or that might be correlated with factors that influence – 
institutional choices.  
 
III. Tradeoffs 
We have argued that the size of a polity in the modern era affects its institutional form, with 
larger (more populous) polities developing less concentrated systems of rule. We have presented 
evidence for this pattern across nation-states and across subnational units (states, counties, and 
cities), using a wide variety of outcome measures focused on the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of power concentration. The reasons for this persistent relationship, we theorized, 
rest on the quest for greater efficiency and trust. 
If our argument is correct there is an important tradeoff between extensive and intensive 
rule. Increasing the size of a polity decreases its probable concentration of power, while 
decreasing its size increases its probable concentration. It follows that polities may be organized 
to rule intensively (in a concentrated fashion) over a small populace or extensively (in a de-
concentrated fashion) over a large populace. 
This tradeoff faced the New England colonists in the eighteenth-century just as it faces 
the current members, and prospective members, of the European Union today. Our theory 
suggests that had the thirteen colonies evolved into independent states, rather than joining 
together in a confederation, they would have developed fairly concentrated systems of rule. Our 
theory also suggests that the larger the EU becomes the more fissiparous its governance 
                                                
18 State boundaries are a product of a variety of geographic and historical forces that are too complicated to review 
(Stein 2008) but which may be regarded as random with respect to the causal question of theoretical interest. Once 
admitted to the union, states have maintained their historical boundaries – meaning that almost all state boundaries 
have been fixed for at least a century and a half. By contrast, county and city boundaries have evolved considerably 
over time, largely in response to demographic factors (the growth and movement of population) and political 
pressures. Sometimes population growth stimulates a fusion of units, sometimes it stimulates fission. But, unlike 
nation-state formation, we do not expect fission or fusion to be affected by the institutional format of a 
subnational unit. 
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structure is likely to become, and the more it is likely to emulate the previous condition of 
Europe as a region of (formally) independent states.  
 The intensive/extensive tradeoff has important implications for problems of 
coordination, and hence for governance. Briefly, where states are small (and unified), problems 
of coordination arise between states. Where states are large (and fragmented), problems of 
coordination arise within states while coordination problems between states is mitigated by their 
smaller numbers. 
The intensive/extensive tradeoff also has important implications for democratic theory. 
When one considers opportunities for participation, the achievement of accountability, and 
other democratic virtues, the position of a citizen in a small polity with concentrated institutions 
may be roughly equivalent to the position of a citizen in a large polity with dispersed 
institutions. Citizens may be loosely governed by a larger, more fragmented polity in which 
considerable power is delegated to local officials. Or they may be tightly governed by a smaller, 
more centralized polity. 
One must also consider that larger polities usually enjoy greater de facto sovereignty, 
which may be understood in terms of military power (Davis 1954; Hendershot 1973; Organski 
& Organski 1961), soft power (Nye 2005), or freedom from external obligations and constraints 
(Lake 2009).19 While large states delegate “down” (to various institutions within the state), small 
states delegate “up” (to international organizations), surrendering some aspects of sovereignty 
in the process (Hawkins et al. 2006). This means that the citizen of a large polity enjoys greater 
self-rule than the citizen of a small polity, being less dependent upon the actions of international 
institutions, bilateral and multilateral agreements, foreign countries, and the vagaries of 
international trade. Insofar as democracy presumes sovereignty, the citizen in a larger polity 
enjoys a greater degree of that ineffable quantity. 
The strongest formulation of our argument suggests that there is an equilibrating feature 
inherent in political organization in the modern era such that a similar level of citizen 
engagement and influence, sovereignty, and overall coordination is retained regardless of the 
size of the political unit(s).20 An implication of this argument is that the size question (how large 
should a polity be?), which has preoccupied scholars and state-makers for millennia, is no 
longer as consequential as it once was. Large polities reproduce the features of small polities by 
                                                
19 While measuring sovereignty across nation-states is complicated, it is fairly easy to measure this concept across 
counties and cities at the subnational level in the US. It turns out that the right of “home rule” is much more likely 
to be achieved by larger municipalities than by smaller municipalities, as shown in Table F1. 
20 This is presuming that small and large polities are equally likely to sustain multi-party competition, i.e., that size 
has no impact on regime-type, a subject about which there is no consensus (Anckar 2008; Dahl & Tufte 1973; 
Gerring et al. 2015; Ott 2000; Veenendaal 2013). 
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diffusing power internally, both vertically and horizontally. Small polities reproduce the features 
of large polities by delegating power externally. We do not mean to suggest that all things are 
truly equal, and that size is therefore irrelevant. But it does seem appropriate to conclude that 
the substantive differences arising from polity size are often overdrawn. Size affects structure, 
but in ways that are re-equilibrating. 
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Appendix A:  Cross-country Data Description 
Table A1:  Variable Definitions 
 
Left-side Variables 
Federalism.  An institutionalized division or sharing of responsibilities between a national authority and 
semiautonomous regional units, usually codified in a constitution. 0=nonfederal (regional governments, if they 
exist, are granted minimal policy-making power), 1=semifederal (there are elective governments at the regional 
level but constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), 2=federal (elective regional 
governments plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority).  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: Gerring & 
Thacker (2008: 88).  federalism_GT 
Subnational gov layers.  Comprised of two variables measuring whether local and regional governments exist, as 
coded by research assistants and regional experts enlisted by V-Dem. These are added together to form a three-
level index: 0=none, 1=one level, or 3=both levels.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  
subnational_layers 
Subnational elections.  Measures the existence (=1) or non-existence (=0) of elections at subnational levels, as 
coded by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings aggregated by a Bayesian IRT 
measurement model, which transforms the binary variable into an interval variable.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: 
V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  v2elffelrbin 
Autonomous regions.  Measures the existence (=1) or nonexistence (=0) of regions enjoying substantial 
autonomy from the national government.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: DPI (Beck et al. 2001). e_dpi_auton 
Revenue decentralization.  Subnational revenue as share of total public revenue.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: 
GFS, as compiled by Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya (2007). Decentraliz_rev_EZ 
Government consumption.  Central government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services, 
including payment of employees and most expenditures on national defense and security (but not those 
considered part of government capital formation), as a share of GDP.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: WDI (World 
Bank 20??). 
Separate powers.  1=the dominant executive (either the head of state or head of government) is directly elected, 
0=otherwise. Coding by research assistants and regional experts enlisted by the V-Dem project.  Rescaled from 
0-1.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  prez_JG2 
Divided party control.  The extent to which a single party or coalition controls both the executive and legislative 
branches of national government, based on coding by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Multiple 
ratings aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval 
variable.  (The nominal V-Dem variable is reordered to reflect an ordinal scale.)  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: V-
Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  Natparmms 
Decentralized parties.  Measures how centralized the process of candidate selection for the national legislature is 
– specifically, the extent to which national party leaders control the process or share power with constituents and 
local and regional party actors, as judged by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings 
aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval 
variable.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  v2pscnslnl 
Judicial review.  Measures whether any court in the judiciary has the legal authority to invalidate governmental 
policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a 
constitutional provision, as coded by country experts enlisted for the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings aggregated 
by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval variable.  Rescaled 
from 0-1.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  v2jureview 
Constitution length.  Records the number of words in a constitution. Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: CCP (Elkins, 
Ginsburg & Melton 2009). Length 
Constitution scope.  Measures the scope of a constitution based on the proportion of selected issues (following 
standard CCP categories) that are covered. Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: CCP (Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton 2009). 
Scope 
Constitution rigidity.  Measures the number of actors required to approve constitutional amendments, according 
to the constitution.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: CCP (Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton 2009).  Apprs 
Bicameralism.  Measures the existence of two chambers in the national legislature and – if they exist – how 
closely matched their powers are, based on the coding of country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. 
Multiple ratings aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into 
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an interval variable.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  Legbalance 
Legislative committees.  Measures whether the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature has a 
functioning committee system and, if so, whether they are permanent (or special) and whether they have a strong 
influence on the course of policymaking, as coded by experts enlisted for the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings 
aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval 
variable.  Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  v2lgcomslo 
Legislative fractionalization.  Measures the probability that two randomly drawn representatives from the lower 
(or unicameral) chamber of the legislature will be from different parties. Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: PolCon 
(Henisz 2002). Legfralower 
Political constraints.  “The extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in 
government policy,” taking into account the number of independent branches of government and the 
preferences of each of these branches. Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: PolCon (Henisz 2002: 363), where it is 
referred to as PolConIII.  polconiii 
Checks & balances.  “The number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for whether these veto players 
are independent of each other, as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their 
respective party affiliations, and the electoral rules.” Rescaled from 0-1.  Source: DPI (Beck et al. 2001), where it 
is referred to as Checks1.  Checks_DPI 
Capital city.  Population of capital city as a share of total population, transformed by the natural logarithm. 
Calculated by authors. Rescaled from 0-1.  Sources for capital city population: UN (2014), supplemented by 
other sources. capital_pop_share_ln 
Right-side Variables 
Population.  Total population, missing data within a time-series interpolated.  Source: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), 
drawing on Goldewijk, Beusen & Janssen (2010), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde).  
e_pepopula_ipo_2_ln 
GDP per cap (ln).  Gross domestic product per capita, missing data within a time-series interpolated, transformed 
by the natural logarithm. Source: Bolt & van Zanden (2014).  e_migdppc_2_ipo_ln 
Urbanization.  Share of total population living in cities, missing data within a time-series interpolated. Missing 
data interpolated within a time-series. Sources: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu) based on a variety of underlying sources.  
e_urbaniz 
English legal origin.  Dummy variable indicating English legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). 
English_legal_origin 
French legal origin.  Dummy variable indicating French legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). 
French_legal_origin 
German legal origin.  Dummy variable indicating German legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). 
German_legal_origin 
Scandinavian legal origin.  Dummy variable indicating Scandinavian legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). 
Scandinavian_legal_origin 
Socialist legal origin.  Dummy variable indicating Socialist legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). 
Socialist_legal_origin 
Latitude (ln).  Distance from equator, transformed by natural logarithm.  Latitude_ln 
Lexical index of electoral democracy.  A 7-level ordinal scale measuring the electoral components of democracy 
in a cumulative fashion. Source: Skaaning, Gerring & Bartusevi ius (2015).  lexical_scale 
Muslim.  Percent Muslim. Source: CIA WorldFactbook (on-line).  Muslim 
Protestant.  Percent Protestant. Source: CIA WorldFactbook (on-line). Protestant 
OPEC.  Dummy variable indicating membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.  OPEC 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  Probability of two randomly chosen individuals being members of the same 
ethnolinguistic group. Source: Easterly & Levine (1997), missing data imputed from other sources. 
Ethnolinguistic_fract_imp 
Territory.  Land area, square kilometers, transformed by the natural logarithm. Source: WDI (World Bank 2007).  
wdi_area_extended_ln    
Arable land.  Percent of state’s territory that is arable land in 1960. Source: WDI (World Bank 2005). 
Land_use_arable_ext_1960 
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Table A2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Left-side variables Obs     Mean     SD     Min   Max 
Federalism 6,354 0.191 0.374 0 1 
Subnational government layers 16,181 0.931 0.176 0 1 
Subnational elections 16,212 0.638 0.291 0 1 
Autonomous regions 6,139 0.122 0.327 0 1 
Revenue decentralization 1,398 0.282 0.241 0 1 
Government consumption 6,638 0.188 0.092 0 1 
Separate powers 16,477 0.232 0.422 0 1 
Divided party control 16,106 0.549 0.266 0 1 
Decentralized parties 16,281 0.339 0.199 0 1 
Judicial review  16,403 0.543 0.293 0 1 
Constitution length 960 0.031 0.080 0 1 
Constitution scope 765 0.575 0.158 0 1 
Constitution rigidity 906 0.318 0.265 0 1 
Bicameralism 17,547 0.344 0.328 0 1 
Legislative committees 12,106 0.533 0.173 0 1 
Legislative fractionalization 8,504 0.477 0.289 0 1 
Political constraints 14,808 0.220 0.290 0 1 
Checks & balances 6,004 0.246 0.229 0 1 
Capital city 19,895 0.509 0.120 0 1 
Right-side variables      
Population (logged) 96,479 6.239 2.568 -2.157 14.101 
GDP per capita (logged) 20,764 0.350 0.251 0.008 1.000 
Urbanization 10,907 7.844 1.037 5.315 10.667 
English legal origin 40,635 0.333 0.471 0.000 1.000 
French legal origin 20,256 0.423 0.494 0.000 1.000 
German legal origin 20,256 0.037 0.189 0.000 1.000 
Scandinavian legal origin 20,256 0.021 0.144 0.000 1.000 
Socialist legal origin 20,034 0.187 0.390 0.000 1.000 
Latitude (logged) 40,205 -1.596 0.950 -4.500 -0.341 
Muslim 40,850 23.255 35.890 0.000 99.900 
Protestant 39,576 12.686 22.863 0.000 98.000 
OPEC 41,065 0.058 0.233 0.000 1.000 
Lexical index of electoral democracy 17,248 2.820 2.363 0 6 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 21,441 0.342 0.281 -0.072 1.000 
Territory (logged) 41,065 11.280 2.725 0.693 16.612 
Arable land 21,620 14.049 14.119 0.043 66.250 
 
Sample constrained to 1789- period. 
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Table A3:  Inter-Correlation among Measures of Power Concentration 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1. Federalism 1.00                  
2. Subnational gov layers 0.16 1.00                 
3. Subnational elections 0.26 0.10 1.00                
4. Autonomous regions 0.07 0.04 0.08 1.00               
5. Revenue decentraliz 0.55 0.16 0.25 0.14 1.00              
6. Govt consumption -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.14 1.00             
7. Separate powers -0.02 0.09 0.21 0.01 -0.05 -0.21 1.00            
8. Divided party control 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.17 -0.04 0.01 1.00           
9. Decentralized parties 0.28 -0.08 0.38 0.08 0.46 0.16 0.09 0.01 1.00          
10. Judicial review  0.20 0.04 0.26 0.09 0.21 0.03 0.28 0.08 0.29 1.00         
11. Constitution length 0.22 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 -0.04 -0.18 0.12 0.02 0.26 0.36 1.00        
12. Constitution scope 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.05 -0.15 0.23 0.04 0.17 0.34 0.68 1.00       
13. Constitution rigidity 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.20 1.00      
14. Bicameralism 0.32 0.08 0.40 0.05 0.26 -0.09 0.27 0.02 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.18 0.15 1.00     
15. Leg. committees 0.12 0.05 0.36 0.20 0.31 0.02 0.21 0.11 0.35 0.43 0.23 0.32 0.11 0.26 1.00    
16. Leg. fractionalization 0.05 -0.08 0.29 0.09 0.18 0.03 -0.10 0.25 0.44 0.39 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.26 0.47 1.00   
17. Political constraints 0.15 -0.14 0.42 0.11 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.55 0.45 0.28 0.22 0.16 0.30 0.54 0.73 1.00  
18. Checks & balances 0.18 -0.09 0.39 0.15 0.29 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.49 0.56 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.34 0.54 0.69 0.73 1.00 
19. Capital city -0.37 -0.20 -0.11 -0.15 -0.33 0.21 0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.11 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.00 
 
Includes all outcome variables employed in Tables 2 and 3. 
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Table A4:  Principal Components Analysis of Measures of Power Concentration 
 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 4.889 3.072 0.257 0.257 
2 1.817 0.248 0.096 0.353 
3 1.570 0.476 0.083 0.436 
4 1.093 0.030 0.058 0.493 
5 1.063 0.050 0.056 0.549 
6 1.014 0.113 0.053 0.602 
7 0.901 0.047 0.047 0.650 
8 0.854 0.029 0.045 0.695 
9 0.825 0.038 0.043 0.738 
10 0.787 0.080 0.041 0.780 
11 0.707 0.085 0.037 0.817 
12 0.622 0.065 0.033 0.850 
13 0.557 0.030 0.029 0.879 
14 0.527 0.044 0.028 0.907 
15 0.482 0.029 0.025 0.932 
16 0.453 0.080 0.024 0.956 
17 0.373 0.119 0.020 0.975 
18 0.255 0.042 0.013 0.989 
19 0.213 . 0.011 1 
 
 
Variable Component 1 Unexplained 
Federalism 0.132 0.915 
Subnational government layers 0.050 0.988 
Subnational elections 0.260 0.670 
Autonomous regions 0.093 0.958 
Revenue decentralization 0.175 0.851 
Government consumption -0.041 0.992 
Separate powers 0.086 0.964 
Divided party control 0.099 0.952 
Decentralized parties 0.266 0.654 
Judicial review  0.311 0.526 
Constitution length -0.063 0.981 
Constitution scope 0.275 0.630 
Constitution rigidity 0.139 0.905 
Bicameralism 0.236 0.727 
Legislative committees 0.354 0.387 
Legislative fractionalization 0.360 0.367 
Political constraints 0.364 0.351 
Checks & balances 0.362 0.361 
Capital city -0.116 0.935 
 
 
Principal components analysis (un-rotated), retaining the first component. Missing data for all countries over the 
period, 1976 to 2015, is replaced with the average of 20 imputed data sets generated by the Amelia II program. N 
= 7,934.  Rho = 0.2927. 
 
  
 
 
48 
Figure A1:  Histogram of Population (ln) 
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Appendix B:  Cross-country Tests, Full Reports 
 
Table B1:  Federalism 
 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.362*** 1.028*** 1.126*** 0.986** 0.834** 0.732*** 0.277*** 1.097*** 0.643*** 
    (0.129) (0.310) (0.307) (0.400) (0.330) (0.282) (0.068) (0.328) (0.119) 
Urbanization  -0.779 0.076 -2.478 0.046 5.295* 0.073 -1.178 1.361 
  (2.124) (1.719) (3.356) (1.967) (3.055) (0.589) (2.390) (1.129) 
GDPpc (logged)  1.773** 2.205*** 1.619* 1.604** 0.242 0.162 1.806** 0.726** 
  (0.691) (0.797) (0.923) (0.648) (0.719) (0.120) (0.767) (0.345) 
English legal origin  3.794* 4.397** 5.385** 3.740* [omitted] 1.530** 4.448** 1.050 
  (2.116) (2.233) (2.279) (2.061)  (0.735) (2.131) (1.001) 
French legal origin  1.053 0.972 2.433 1.274 [omitted] 0.735 1.677 -0.192 
  (1.631) (1.669) (1.704) (1.637)  (0.685) (1.612) (0.877) 
German legal origin  [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] 
          
Scandinavian legal   [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] 
   Origin          
Latitude (logged)  -0.277 -0.436 -0.133 -0.338 0.006 -0.148 -0.248 -0.327 
  (0.461) (0.475) (0.545) (0.445) (0.367) (0.133) (0.519) (0.201) 
Muslim  0.032* 0.040 0.041 0.031** 0.028 0.011** 0.028 0.016** 
  (0.017) (0.026) (0.049) (0.016) (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.008) 
OPEC  2.011 2.406* 2.896 1.923 0.725 0.836 2.508* 0.567 
  (1.225) (1.409) (2.317) (1.253) (1.335) (0.630) (1.350) (0.749) 
Protestant  -0.014 -0.032 0.007 -0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.013 -0.013 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.020) (0.008) (0.026) (0.011) 
Democracy    0.223*       
   (lexical scale)   (0.126)       
Ethnolinguistic    5.658**       
   fract.   (2.337)       
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Observations 6,266 4,823 4,706 3,524 4,776 114 19,982 4,215 3,678 
Countries 157 125 125 107 125 114 202 122 104 
Years 103 103 103 103 101 1 115 103 103 
R2 (pseudo) (0.061) (0.403) (0.451) (0.381) (0.376) (0.350)  (0.411)  
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B1:  Federalism 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B1. 
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Table B2:  Subnational Government Layers 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit O.logit 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.513*** 0.546** 0.789* 0.331 0.353 1.289* 0.335*** 0.477* 0.026** 
    (0.110) (0.271) (0.416) (0.282) (0.233) (0.711) (0.093) (0.256) (0.010) 
Urbanization  0.896 -0.157 -0.718 1.318 7.030** 1.497 2.163 0.047 
  (1.841) (2.095) (2.860) (1.866) (3.340) (0.928) (1.968) (0.090) 
GDPpc (logged)  -0.916** -0.622 -1.314* -1.079** -1.891** -0.426* -1.299*** -0.039** 
  (0.445) (0.533) (0.774) (0.461) (0.958) (0.217) (0.425) (0.019) 
English legal origin  -18.154** [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] -12.666*** -0.471 [omitted] -0.056 
  (7.253)    (2.355) (0.726)  (0.049) 
French legal origin  -17.252*** -17.513*** -18.291*** -16.240*** -12.923*** 0.344 [omitted] 0.000 
  (5.875) (5.960) (5.588) (2.442) (1.599) (0.716)  (0.033) 
German legal origin  2.006 [omitted] 0.667 1.967** 4.180** 1.576* [omitted] 0.086** 
  (4.373)  (5.721) (0.978) (1.831) (0.912)  (0.038) 
Scandinavian legal  [omitted] [omitted] -5.951 0.096 2.595 3.382*** [omitted] 0.000 
   Origin    (4.028) (2.845) (2.289) (1.164)  (0.057) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.538 -0.960 -0.333 -0.470 -1.117 0.040 -0.466 -0.023 
  (0.474) (0.697) (0.469) (0.467) (1.640) (0.199) (0.499) (0.015) 
Muslim  -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.005 -0.007 -0.000 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.000) 
OPEC  -0.033 -1.244 1.329 0.069 -3.631* 0.723 3.163** 0.005 
  (1.385) (1.289) (1.442) (1.412) (2.065) (0.807) (1.474) (0.052) 
Protestant  0.026 0.046** 0.085*** 0.030 0.036 0.003 0.034* 0.001 
  (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.035) (0.008) (0.018) (0.001) 
Democracy    -0.050       
   (lexical scale)   (0.075)       
Ethnolinguistic    -0.716       
   fract.   (1.224)       
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Observations 15,119 10,807 9,175 7,241 10,720 143 19,982 7,139 10,391 
Countries 158 144 144 127 144 143 202 140 140 
Years 112 112 112 115 110 1 115 112 112 
R2 (pseudo) (0.126) (0.271)   (0.372) (0.246) (0.428)   (0.319) 0.192 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B2:  Subnational Government Layers 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B2. 
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Table B3:  Subnational Elections 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.048*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.028** 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.003*** 0.038*** 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012) 
Urbanization  0.033 -0.014 -0.198* 0.056 0.037 0.018 -0.019 0.002 0.021 
  (0.104) (0.092) (0.114) (0.105) (0.156) (0.036) (0.102) (0.009) (0.094) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.067*** 0.054*** 0.083** 0.060*** 0.035 0.016** 0.064*** 0.005** 0.062*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.034) (0.021) (0.034) (0.007) (0.023) (0.002) (0.020) 
English legal origin  -0.009 -0.051 0.099* 0.011 0.244** 0.069* 0.038 0.003 0.021 
  (0.060) (0.062) (0.056) (0.058) (0.118) (0.037) (0.067) (0.005) (0.058) 
French legal origin  -0.121** -0.157*** -0.037 -0.111** 0.107 0.022 -0.104 -0.009** -0.099* 
  (0.055) (0.052) (0.049) (0.054) (0.118) (0.034) (0.068) (0.005) (0.054) 
German legal origin  0.091 0.060 0.166** 0.094 0.231** 0.075* 0.059 0.012** 0.149** 
  (0.067) (0.068) (0.064) (0.067) (0.103) (0.042) (0.071) (0.006) (0.066) 
Scandinavian legal   -0.150* -0.164* -0.023 -0.153* 0.045 -0.028 -0.114 -0.009 -0.125 
   Origin  (0.090) (0.089) (0.097) (0.089) (0.139) (0.047) (0.094) (0.009) (0.091) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.009 -0.036** -0.025 -0.009 -0.033 0.008 0.010 -0.002 -0.012 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.009) (0.019) (0.002) (0.019) 
Muslim  0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
OPEC  -0.072 -0.092 -0.078 -0.072 -0.038 -0.015 0.005 -0.006 -0.070 
  (0.079) (0.061) (0.080) (0.077) (0.087) (0.034) (0.109) (0.007) (0.079) 
Protestant  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Democracy    0.033***        
   (lexical scale)   (0.005)        
Ethnolinguistic    0.107        
   fract.   (0.071)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 15,151 10,890 9,258 7,230 10,803 144 19,982 7,203 10,808 10,474 
Countries 158 145 145 128 145 144 202 141 145 141 
Years 112 112 112 115 110 1 115 112 111 112 
R2 (pseudo) 0.095 0.327 0.404 0.319 0.319 0.278  0.336  0.345 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B3:  Subnational Elections 
 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B3. 
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Table B4:  Autonomous Regions 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.496*** 0.555** 0.482* 0.718** 0.419* 0.687 0.404*** 0.543* 0.170 
    (0.151) (0.267) (0.255) (0.296) (0.225) (0.456) (0.113) (0.286) (0.138) 
Urbanization  -1.591 -1.668 -2.550 -1.412 -3.524 -0.561 -2.251 -0.707 
  (2.437) (2.629) (2.805) (2.447) (2.323) (1.171) (2.321) (0.426) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.464 0.618 0.615 0.451 -0.981 0.024 0.658 0.285 
  (1.208) (1.200) (0.831) (1.125) (1.709) (0.315) (1.097) (0.134) 
English legal origin  16.368*** 14.652*** 14.558*** 16.003*** 16.257*** 4.792*** 16.507 5.020*** 
  (0.378) (2.051) (1.380) (1.739) (2.216) (1.166) (34.483) (0.470) 
French legal origin  17.039*** 15.292*** 15.356*** 16.579*** 18.134*** 5.085*** 17.423 5.303*** 
  (1.055) (1.683) (1.430) (1.643) (1.814) (1.088) (37.027) (0.459) 
German legal origin  -2.804 -3.806 -2.871 -2.939  2.128 -1.098  
  (2.536) (2.662) (1.792) (2.393)  (1.315) (38.071)  
Scandinavian legal   19.255*** 17.865*** 17.468*** 18.354*** 18.231*** 6.844*** 19.334 6.495*** 
   Origin  (1.427) (2.531) (2.048) (2.402) (3.126) (1.756) (24.023) (0.751) 
Latitude (logged)  0.949 0.886 1.247 0.795 0.264 0.272 0.766 0.500 
  (0.921) (0.907) (1.045) (0.819) (0.635) (0.389) (0.672) (0.097) 
Muslim  0.016 0.018 -0.005 0.018 0.012 0.018** 0.017 0.007 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) 
OPEC  0.893 0.661 1.270 0.857 1.934** 0.659 -0.429 0.605 
  (1.125) (1.218) (1.430) (1.139) (0.967) (0.831) (1.265) (0.258) 
Protestant  -0.027* -0.031* -0.028 -0.023 -0.004 -0.015 -0.024 -0.017* 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.011) (0.016) (0.006) 
Democracy    0.152       
   (lexical scale)   (0.099)       
Ethnolinguistic    2.383**       
   fract.   (1.171)       
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Observations 5,834 4,916 4,817 3,272 4,916 133 7,498 3,038 4,470 
Countries 171 147 147 128 147 133 200 128 134 
Years 37 37 37 38 37 1 40 37 37 
R2 (pseudo) (0.096) (0.317) (0.338) (0.368) (0.303) (0.415)  (0.280)  
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B4:  Autonomous Regions 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B4. 
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Table B5:  Revenue Decentralization 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.048*** 0.080*** 0.073*** 0.099*** 0.069*** 0.033*** 0.010*** 0.083*** 0.005*** 0.123*** 
    (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.021) 
Urbanization  0.110 0.047 -0.298* 0.114 0.204* 0.054** 0.059 -0.003 0.018 
  (0.148) (0.167) (0.152) (0.155) (0.120) (0.023) (0.176) (0.013) (0.172) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.053 0.064 0.122 0.051 -0.018 -0.002 0.025 0.011*** 0.068 
  (0.040) (0.046) (0.075) (0.040) (0.031) (0.005) (0.047) (0.003) (0.049) 
English legal origin  -0.737*** -0.679*** -0.562*** -0.713*** 0.042 -0.069** -0.144 -0.052*** -0.520*** 
  (0.148) (0.133) (0.124) (0.149) (0.103) (0.029) (0.131) (0.017) (0.151) 
French legal origin  -0.857*** -0.820*** -0.781*** -0.843*** -0.061 -0.079*** -0.322** -0.059*** -0.650*** 
  (0.132) (0.112) (0.092) (0.133) (0.123) (0.027) (0.134) (0.017) (0.128) 
German legal origin  -0.379*** -0.351*** -0.282*** -0.387*** 0.228 0.034 0.188 -0.034*** -0.134 
  (0.086) (0.082) (0.079) (0.088) (0.147) (0.043) (0.184) (0.009) (0.082) 
Scandinavian legal   -0.573*** -0.481*** -0.414** -0.617*** 0.084 -0.000 -0.005 -0.043*** -0.273 
   Origin  (0.180) (0.152) (0.167) (0.187) (0.185) (0.046) (0.230) (0.017) (0.179) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.008 0.006 -0.023 -0.010 0.011 -0.005 0.013 0.004* -0.008 
  (0.032) (0.035) (0.055) (0.032) (0.032) (0.005) (0.039) (0.002) (0.037) 
Muslim  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003 0.002** 0.001 0.000* 0.003** 0.000* 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
OPEC  -0.228*** -0.267*** -0.251*** -0.229*** -0.088* -0.029* -0.181*** -0.018*** -0.308*** 
  (0.061) (0.064) (0.055) (0.066) (0.048) (0.017) (0.058) (0.007) (0.066) 
Protestant  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001** 0.002 0.000 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Democracy    0.002        
   (lexical scale)   (0.007)        
Ethnolinguistic    0.324***        
   fract.   (0.115)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 1,378 1,268 1,265 899 1,268 59 8,029 1,032 1,148 1,238 
Countries 101 94 94 58 94 59 201 81 91 92 
Years 29 29 29 29 29 1 43 29 28 29 
R2 (pseudo) 0.111 0.582 0.630 0.654 0.557 0.641  0.619  0.540 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B5:  Revenue Decentralization 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B5. 
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Table B6:  Government Consumption 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.005 -0.010*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.009** -0.001** -0.014*** 
    (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) 
Urbanization  0.077** 0.077** 0.126*** 0.071** 0.085 0.022 0.050 0.004 0.097*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.034) (0.054) (0.024) (0.034) (0.004) (0.035) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.009 0.009 -0.013 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.010 0.002** 0.015* 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
English legal origin  -0.069 -0.069 -0.072 -0.077 -0.045 -0.062* 0.057** -0.007 -0.066 
  (0.062) (0.061) (0.075) (0.061) (0.065) (0.034) (0.023) (0.005) (0.063) 
French legal origin  -0.090 -0.089 -0.090 -0.094 -0.060 -0.070** 0.031 -0.010* -0.095 
  (0.064) (0.062) (0.077) (0.063) (0.066) (0.035) (0.020) (0.005) (0.065) 
German legal origin  -0.119** -0.121** -0.094 -0.118** -0.094 -0.081** -0.021 -0.012** -0.124** 
  (0.053) (0.051) (0.062) (0.053) (0.057) (0.031) (0.041) (0.005) (0.057) 
Scandinavian legal   -0.052 -0.053 -0.029 -0.048 -0.005 -0.033 0.078** -0.004 -0.047 
   Origin  (0.066) (0.064) (0.077) (0.065) (0.066) (0.039) (0.034) (0.006) (0.068) 
Latitude (logged)  0.008 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.014 -0.003 0.011* 0.001 0.005 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) 
Muslim  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEC  -0.000 -0.001 0.011 -0.003 0.002 -0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.014) (0.019) (0.002) (0.016) 
Protestant  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Democracy    0.001        
   (lexical scale)   (0.002)        
Ethnolinguistic    -0.014        
   fract.   (0.023)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 6,521 5,625 5,527 3,631 5,625 142 9,957 3,703 5,465 5,397 
Countries 171 146 146 127 146 142 201 132 146 139 
Years 51 51 51 51 51 1 54 51 50 51 
R2 (pseudo) 0.080 0.333 0.341 0.388 0.323 0.375  0.427  0.362 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
 
 
 
60 
Figure B6:  Government Consumption 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B6. 
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Table B7:  Separate Powers 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.192*** 0.416*** 0.357** 0.314* 0.269** 0.373** 0.086 0.541** 0.174* 
    (0.070) (0.139) (0.165) (0.161) (0.114) (0.177) (0.065) (0.227) (0.091) 
Urbanization  0.879 0.396 -2.823* 1.032 0.754 1.558*** 1.430 0.300 
  (0.931) (1.022) (1.669) (0.934) (1.646) (0.491) (1.343) (0.413) 
GDPpc (logged)  -0.135 -0.201 0.519 -0.233 -0.437 -0.108 -0.571 -0.054 
  (0.268) (0.316) (0.464) (0.258) (0.400) (0.117) (0.349) (0.122) 
English legal origin  1.384 0.673 0.739 1.598* 31.118*** -0.866 -0.076 0.579 
  (0.843) (0.866) (0.893) (0.867) (2.127) (0.699) (0.939) (0.429) 
French legal origin  2.149*** 1.667** 1.815** 2.174*** 31.202*** -0.768 0.325 1.047*** 
  (0.770) (0.738) (0.791) (0.802) (2.077) (0.700) (0.942) (0.421) 
German legal origin  1.893* 1.185 1.129 1.757* 17.733*** -1.637* -1.341  
  (1.079) (1.123) (1.217) (1.056) (1.804) (0.910) (1.476)  
Scandinavian legal   2.081 1.356 1.510 1.903  -0.759 0.831 0.950 
   Origin  (1.853) (1.737) (1.759) (1.894)  (1.491) (1.917) (0.762) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.389** -0.477** -0.229 -0.348* -0.215 -0.319*** -0.396 -0.221** 
  (0.189) (0.220) (0.237) (0.182) (0.345) (0.119) (0.251) (0.092) 
Muslim  0.017*** 0.020*** 0.011 0.017*** 0.012 0.016*** 0.016** 0.010*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) 
OPEC  -1.435*** -1.387** -1.041** -1.317*** -0.674 -1.055*** -1.190 -0.786*** 
  (0.496) (0.558) (0.508) (0.471) (0.923) (0.368) (0.774) (0.254) 
Protestant  0.018 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.007 -0.000 0.013 0.010 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) 
Democracy    0.238***       
   (lexical scale)   (0.073)       
Ethnolinguistic    0.889       
   fract.   (0.725)       
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Observations 15,398 10,996 9,339 7,314 10,909 141 22,815 7,140 10,156 
Countries 160 146 146 129 146 141 204 140 138 
Years 112 112 112 115 110 1 115 112 112 
R2 (pseudo) 0.0211 0.336 0.335 0.417 0.322 0.290  0.457  
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B7:  Separate Powers 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B7. 
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Table B8:  Divided Party Control 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.021*** 0.023** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.024** 0.045** 0.005* 0.029*** 0.002** 0.017 
    (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.013) 
Urbanization  -0.128 -0.146 -0.154 -0.113 -0.163 -0.054* -0.085 -0.020* -0.072 
  (0.101) (0.107) (0.153) (0.100) (0.200) (0.028) (0.116) (0.011) (0.098) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.032 0.016 0.047 0.027 0.017 0.006 0.016 0.004 0.019 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.045) (0.024) (0.042) (0.007) (0.027) (0.003) (0.025) 
English legal origin  -0.091 -0.175** 0.000 -0.077 0.118 0.007 -0.231*** 0.002 -0.067 
  (0.060) (0.074) (0.114) (0.060) (0.199) (0.027) (0.066) (0.008) (0.067) 
French legal origin  -0.042 -0.110* 0.059 -0.036 0.127 0.004 -0.123** 0.003 -0.030 
  (0.050) (0.065) (0.110) (0.049) (0.194) (0.024) (0.054) (0.007) (0.057) 
German legal origin  0.056 -0.011 0.137 0.064 0.177 0.028 -0.008 0.007 0.088 
  (0.065) (0.073) (0.117) (0.066) (0.200) (0.031) (0.088) (0.009) (0.094) 
Scandinavian legal   0.041 0.013 0.246* 0.047 0.169 0.082** -0.065 0.023* 0.048 
   Origin  (0.098) (0.103) (0.137) (0.099) (0.237) (0.040) (0.107) (0.012) (0.104) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.005 -0.012 0.004 -0.007 0.023 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023) (0.046) (0.009) (0.026) (0.002) (0.023) 
Muslim  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
OPEC  -0.026 -0.044 -0.167** -0.031 -0.147 0.051** -0.123* 0.005 -0.034 
  (0.078) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.096) (0.024) (0.065) (0.006) (0.079) 
Protestant  0.001* 0.001 -0.000 0.001* 0.003 -0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Democracy    0.018**        
   (lexical scale)   (0.008)        
Ethnolinguistic    0.149*        
   fract.   (0.079)        
Electoral system FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 8,894 7,719 7,178 3,661 7,714 130 19,982 5,813 10,751 7,459 
Countries 156 142 142 113 142 130 202 136 146 139 
Years 111 111 111 75 110 1 115 111 111 111 
R2 (pseudo) 0.037 0.137 0.160 0.209 0.139 0.197  0.148  0.091 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B8:  Divided Party Control 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B8. 
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Table B9:  Decentralized Parties 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.021** 0.026*** 0.025** 0.022** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.010*** 0.030*** 0.021** 
    (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
Urbanization  0.197** 0.164** 0.029 0.217*** 0.096 0.125*** 0.247*** 0.233*** 
  (0.080) (0.077) (0.111) (0.078) (0.099) (0.033) (0.083) (0.077) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.009 -0.008 0.038 0.004 -0.006 0.001 0.012 -0.004 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.007) (0.020) (0.017) 
English legal origin  0.072 0.046 0.179*** 0.085* 0.263*** 0.037 -0.041 0.089* 
  (0.051) (0.052) (0.056) (0.051) (0.077) (0.026) (0.048) (0.049) 
French legal origin  -0.060 -0.075* -0.003 -0.053 0.144* -0.047* -0.217*** -0.045 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.074) (0.024) (0.041) (0.042) 
German legal origin  0.120 0.102 0.160** 0.125 0.274** 0.029 -0.059 0.151* 
  (0.079) (0.080) (0.069) (0.080) (0.107) (0.046) (0.112) (0.089) 
Scandinavian legal   0.076 0.018 0.118 0.079 0.310*** 0.048 -0.019 0.082 
   Origin  (0.097) (0.099) (0.103) (0.097) (0.118) (0.051) (0.096) (0.097) 
Latitude (logged)  0.011 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.008 -0.003 0.005 0.010 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) 
Muslim  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEC  0.000 0.017 -0.011 -0.002 0.008 0.002 -0.034 0.003 
  (0.038) (0.047) (0.030) (0.039) (0.060) (0.021) (0.032) (0.036) 
Protestant  0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy    0.024***       
   (lexical scale)   (0.003)       
Ethnolinguistic    0.010       
   fract.   (0.041)       
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Observations 15,205 10,897 9,240 7,189 10,814 145 19,982 7,206 10,481 
Countries 160 146 146 129 146 145 202 142 142 
Years 112 112 112 115 110 1 115 112 112 
R2 (pseudo) 0.037 0.531 0.564 0.601 0.528 0.471  0.616 0.542 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B9:  Decentralized Parties 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B9. 
 
  
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
De
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 p
ar
tie
s
1 million 10 million 100 million 1 billion
Population (logged scale)
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
 
 
67 
Table B10:  Judicial Review 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.022** 0.021* 0.018 0.006 0.020* 0.021* 0.012*** 0.027** 0.025* 
    (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.014) 
Urbanization  0.158* 0.122 0.419*** 0.175* 0.059 0.088*** 0.266*** 0.168* 
  (0.093) (0.087) (0.159) (0.094) (0.120) (0.026) (0.090) (0.094) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.025 -0.009 -0.038 0.021 -0.002 0.014** 0.014 0.015 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.044) (0.025) (0.025) (0.006) (0.028) (0.026) 
English legal origin  0.347*** 0.270** 0.377*** 0.359*** 0.826*** 0.043 0.092 0.334*** 
  (0.107) (0.114) (0.102) (0.109) (0.118) (0.027) (0.126) (0.110) 
French legal origin  0.250** 0.195 0.264** 0.256** 0.749*** 0.009 -0.067 0.236* 
  (0.118) (0.119) (0.107) (0.119) (0.115) (0.027) (0.146) (0.121) 
German legal origin  0.343*** 0.292** 0.380*** 0.349*** 0.754*** 0.026 -0.022 0.316*** 
  (0.095) (0.113) (0.089) (0.096) (0.111) (0.033) (0.154) (0.115) 
Scandinavian legal   0.632*** 0.579*** 0.662*** 0.635*** 1.030*** 0.124** 0.415*** 0.621*** 
   Origin  (0.143) (0.146) (0.150) (0.144) (0.163) (0.052) (0.158) (0.145) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.041 -0.057** -0.030 -0.042 0.011 -0.013 -0.032 -0.041 
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.009) (0.027) (0.025) 
Muslim  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
OPEC  -0.140 -0.084 -0.086 -0.141 -0.262** -0.055 -0.137 -0.140 
  (0.088) (0.080) (0.085) (0.089) (0.101) (0.034) (0.103) (0.087) 
Protestant  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy    0.050***       
   (lexical scale)   (0.007)       
Ethnolinguistic    0.022       
   fract.   (0.071)       
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Observations 15,336 11,001 9,344 7,293 10,914 145 19,982 7,248 10,585 
Countries 160 146 146 129 146 145 202 142 142 
Years 112 112 112 115 110 1 115 112 112 
R2 (pseudo) 0.021 0.320 0.412 0.351 0.319 0.552  0.378 0.309 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B10:  Judicial Review 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B10. 
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Table B11:  Constitution Length 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 5 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 0.000** -0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization  0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.009 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
English legal origin  0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.009 0.000*** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
French legal origin  -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.011 -0.000 -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
German legal origin  0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
Scandinavian legal   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.000 
   Origin  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Muslim  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEC  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Protestant  0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Democracy    0.000     
   (lexical scale)   (0.000)     
Ethnolinguistic    0.000     
   fract.   (0.000)     
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Observations 731 523 454 456 23,810 210 505 
Countries 185 145 129 141 202 117 136 
Years 195 148 142 99 215 94 145 
R2 (pseudo) 0.005 0.458 0.466 0.459  0.531 0.439 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B11:  Constitution Length 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B11. 
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Table B12:  Constitution Scope 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 5 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.012* 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.012* 0.006*** 0.026*** 0.001 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) 
Urbanization  0.166** 0.192*** 0.217*** 0.052*** 0.116 0.262*** 
  (0.066) (0.073) (0.073) (0.016) (0.089) (0.069) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.039** 0.037* 0.023 0.009*** 0.049** 0.028 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.003) (0.019) (0.018) 
English legal origin  0.001 0.017 0.035 0.011 0.038 0.018 
  (0.028) (0.037) (0.031) (0.030) (0.102) (0.031) 
French legal origin  0.003 0.000 0.032 -0.001 0.067 0.007 
  (0.027) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.101) (0.027) 
German legal origin  0.069 0.043 0.005 0.020 0.143 0.021 
  (0.048) (0.050) (0.052) (0.031) (0.094) (0.050) 
Scandinavian legal   0.035 -0.015 -0.102 0.041 0.096 -0.006 
   Origin  (0.074) (0.093) (0.095) (0.039) (0.118) (0.080) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.011 -0.022* -0.013    
  (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)    
Muslim  0.000 0.001** 0.001    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OPEC  -0.071*** -0.082*** -0.072***    
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.026)    
Protestant  0.000 0.001 0.001    
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Democracy    0.002     
   (lexical scale)   (0.004)     
Ethnolinguistic    -0.015     
   fract.   (0.038)     
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Observations 722 526 455 459 23,810 212 507 
Countries 185 145 129 141 202 119 136 
Years 190 148 142 99 215 95 145 
R2 (pseudo) 0.023 0.244 0.280 0.220  0.283 0.236 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B12:  Constitution Scope 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B12. 
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Table B13:  Constitution Rigidity 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Imputed Electoral Full 
 1 2 3 5 7 8 10 
Population (log) 0.024 0.216*** 0.051 0.155* 0.029 0.262*** -0.054 
    (0.045) (0.073) (0.085) (0.081) (0.018) (0.099) (0.082) 
Urbanization  1.565* 2.150** 1.765** 0.501** 1.785* 2.615*** 
  (0.840) (0.973) (0.871) (0.205) (1.023) (0.711) 
GDPpc (logged)  -0.109 -0.321 -0.065 -0.017 -0.177 -0.323** 
  (0.208) (0.238) (0.207) (0.045) (0.256) (0.155) 
English legal origin  0.362 1.142** 0.325 0.211 0.984 0.221 
  (0.646) (0.487) (0.628) (0.445) (0.826) (0.510) 
French legal origin  0.095 0.227 0.054 -0.035 1.094 0.024 
  (0.614) (0.490) (0.597) (0.445) (0.740) (0.535) 
German legal origin  [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] [omitted] 
        
Scandinavian legal   2.417* 3.329** 2.230 0.589 1.474 2.191** 
   Origin  (1.390) (1.394) (1.682) (0.570) (2.197) (0.927) 
Latitude (logged)  0.010 -0.072 0.217 -0.006 0.048 -0.066 
  (0.157) (0.148) (0.168) (0.061) (0.179) (0.097) 
Muslim  -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
OPEC  0.528 0.567 0.552 0.100 0.613 0.168 
  (0.385) (0.360) (0.446) (0.194) (0.448) (0.285) 
Protestant  -0.004 -0.015 -0.009 -0.001 0.008 -0.013* 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.002) (0.014) (0.007) 
Democracy    0.097*     
   (lexical scale)   (0.050)     
Ethnolinguistic    -0.880     
   fract.   (0.624)     
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Observations 859 616 503 536 23,810 273 568 
Countries 181 142 127 139 202 121 127 
Years 198 157 148 104 215 108 152 
R2 (pseudo) (0.000) (0.038) (0.049) (0.038)  (0.055)  
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B13:  Constitution Rigidity 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B13. 
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Table B14:  Bicameralism 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.019*** 0.078*** 0.005*** 0.054*** 
    (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.013) 
Urbanization  0.249** 0.241* 0.274 0.287*** 0.051 0.079*** 0.366*** 0.017 0.310** 
  (0.106) (0.125) (0.174) (0.109) (0.188) (0.030) (0.118) (0.011) (0.130) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.057*** 0.049* 0.020 0.046** 0.044 0.006 0.039 0.006*** 0.050** 
  (0.021) (0.026) (0.044) (0.021) (0.042) (0.005) (0.025) (0.002) (0.024) 
English legal origin  -0.031 -0.078 0.036 -0.001 0.150 0.059** -0.250*** -0.009 0.026 
  (0.073) (0.079) (0.089) (0.071) (0.163) (0.029) (0.082) (0.006) (0.075) 
French legal origin  -0.017 -0.053 0.105 -0.001 0.160 0.046 -0.228** -0.008 0.033 
  (0.085) (0.078) (0.084) (0.085) (0.160) (0.032) (0.104) (0.007) (0.083) 
German legal origin  0.181 0.157 0.329** 0.181 0.245 0.111** -0.014 0.009 0.314** 
  (0.121) (0.122) (0.127) (0.122) (0.170) (0.044) (0.179) (0.010) (0.148) 
Scandinavian legal   -0.044 -0.094 0.000 -0.053 -0.047 0.013 -0.246* -0.011 0.019 
   Origin  (0.139) (0.145) (0.162) (0.142) (0.226) (0.053) (0.143) (0.012) (0.134) 
Latitude (logged)  0.013 -0.007 0.015 0.014 0.038 0.003 0.019 0.000 0.009 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.033) (0.020) (0.043) (0.006) (0.026) (0.002) (0.020) 
Muslim  0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
OPEC  -0.049 -0.017 -0.036 -0.046 -0.078 -0.011 -0.061 -0.006 -0.052 
  (0.060) (0.059) (0.078) (0.058) (0.120) (0.021) (0.100) (0.005) (0.063) 
Protestant  0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Democracy    0.032***        
   (lexical scale)   (0.008)        
Ethnolinguistic    -0.067        
   fract.   (0.090)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 16,326 11,207 9,396 7,387 11,117 147 19,982 7,393 11,101 10,504 
Countries 169 150 149 132 150 147 202 147 150 142 
Years 112 112 112 115 110 1 115 112 111 112 
R2 (pseudo) 0.108 0.318 0.333 0.269 0.308 0.215  0.448  0.308 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B14:  Bicameralism 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B14. 
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Table B15:  Legislative Committees 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.001*** 0.024*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) 
Urbanization  0.208*** 0.161** 0.345*** 0.230*** 0.066 0.158*** 0.255*** 0.000 0.222*** 
  (0.070) (0.062) (0.090) (0.069) (0.070) (0.031) (0.069) (0.002) (0.068) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.036** 0.029* -0.009 0.031** 0.011 0.017*** 0.021 0.000 0.036** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.018) (0.006) (0.016) (0.001) (0.016) 
English legal origin  0.054 -0.008 0.117*** 0.069* 0.174*** 0.009 0.032 0.006*** 0.052 
  (0.040) (0.042) (0.033) (0.039) (0.062) (0.023) (0.044) (0.002) (0.042) 
French legal origin  0.082** 0.034 0.167*** 0.089*** 0.165*** 0.021 0.067* 0.006*** 0.077** 
  (0.033) (0.034) (0.023) (0.033) (0.055) (0.022) (0.040) (0.002) (0.035) 
German legal origin  0.060 -0.010 0.156*** 0.070* 0.208*** 0.004 0.026 0.006*** 0.050 
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.030) (0.037) (0.053) (0.025) (0.060) (0.001) (0.048) 
Scandinavian legal   0.206** 0.118 0.228*** 0.214** 0.260*** 0.107* 0.199** 0.008*** 0.202** 
   Origin  (0.089) (0.084) (0.081) (0.090) (0.082) (0.056) (0.096) (0.003) (0.091) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.021 -0.026* -0.006 -0.022* -0.017 -0.008 -0.014 -0.000 -0.021 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.001) (0.013) 
Muslim  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000** -0.001* -0.000* -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEC  -0.071* -0.048 -0.069* -0.075** -0.054 -0.021 -0.066 -0.002 -0.072* 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.049) (0.026) (0.041) (0.002) (0.039) 
Protestant  -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Democracy    0.027***        
   (lexical scale)   (0.004)        
Ethnolinguistic    0.032        
   fract.   (0.040)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 11,428 9,385 8,434 6,396 9,324 139 19,982 6,497 9,123 9,103 
Countries 160 146 146 129 146 139 202 140 146 142 
Years 112 112 112 115 110 1 115 112 111 112 
R2 (pseudo) 0.117 0.409 0.458 0.422 0.415 0.437  0.469  0.399 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B15:  Legislative Committees 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B15. 
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Table B16:  Legislative Fractionalization 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit RE Tobit 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.017 0.021* 0.023*** 0.015 0.022* 0.047*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.002* -0.002 
    (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) 
Urbanization  0.037 -0.009 -0.176 0.054 -0.108 0.058* -0.022* 0.007 0.150 
  (0.115) (0.091) (0.150) (0.117) (0.159) (0.030) (0.012) (0.010) (0.429) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.023 -0.017 0.053* 0.019 0.030 0.013*** 0.011*** -0.003 0.034 
  (0.026) (0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.043) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.132) 
English legal origin  0.654*** 0.312*** 0.592*** 0.668*** 0.484*** 0.046* -0.091*** 0.035*** 0.680*** 
  (0.121) (0.093) (0.135) (0.122) (0.143) (0.027) (0.006) (0.008) (0.445) 
French legal origin  0.659*** 0.378*** 0.685*** 0.659*** 0.610*** 0.045* -0.013* 0.037*** 0.669*** 
  (0.121) (0.092) (0.132) (0.122) (0.131) (0.026) (0.007) (0.008) (0.399) 
German legal origin  0.774*** 0.475*** 0.723*** 0.789*** 0.780*** 0.086*** 0.012** 0.046*** 0.771*** 
  (0.118) (0.090) (0.131) (0.121) (0.134) (0.030) (0.005) (0.008) (0.450) 
Scandinavian legal   0.822*** 0.495*** 0.743*** 0.851*** 0.618*** 0.118*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.842*** 
   Origin  (0.136) (0.104) (0.147) (0.136) (0.164) (0.034) (0.008) (0.011) (0.683) 
Latitude (logged)  0.035 -0.000 0.017 0.032 -0.014 -0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.008 
  (0.024) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.137) 
Muslim  -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000** -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
OPEC  -0.045 -0.048 -0.069 -0.049 -0.041 -0.025 0.122*** -0.003 -0.048 
  (0.094) (0.071) (0.080) (0.093) (0.107) (0.021) (0.008) (0.006) (0.233) 
Protestant  -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Democracy    0.089***        
   (lexical scale)   (0.007)        
Ethnolinguistic    0.047        
   fract.   (0.058)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 8,186 7,286 7,078 5,109 6,920 135 23,810 5,370 7,035 7,031 
Countries 151 143 143 125 143 135 202 135 143 136 
Years 212 191 191 162 110 1 215 182 191 191 
R2 (pseudo) (0.006) (0.597) (0.902) (1.054) (0.578) (1.505)  (-4.989)   
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B16:  Legislative Fractionalization 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B16. 
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Table B17:  Political Constraints 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit RE Tobit 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.077** 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.029* 0.065*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.002** -0.024 
    (0.031) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) 
Urbanization  0.140*** 0.077*** 0.024 0.070 -0.353* 0.045 0.045** 0.004 0.269 
  (0.025) (0.016) (0.034) (0.156) (0.196) (0.029) (0.021) (0.011) (0.400) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.097*** 0.009*** 0.069*** 0.103*** 0.050 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.004 0.091** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.035) (0.044) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.124) 
English legal origin  0.594*** 0.191*** 0.615*** 0.669*** 0.721*** 0.055** 0.315*** 0.023*** 0.618*** 
  (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.139) (0.179) (0.026) (0.010) (0.006) (0.354) 
French legal origin  0.585*** 0.254*** 0.689*** 0.604*** 0.786*** 0.050* 0.348*** 0.026*** 0.559*** 
  (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.128) (0.170) (0.026) (0.013) (0.006) (0.324) 
German legal origin  0.814*** 0.400*** 0.814*** 0.866*** 1.014*** 0.071* 0.531*** 0.039*** 0.681*** 
  (0.020) (0.009) (0.018) (0.158) (0.169) (0.036) (0.016) (0.007) (0.359) 
Scandinavian legal   0.605*** 0.250*** 0.620*** 0.717*** 0.704*** 0.079* 0.340*** 0.023** 0.560*** 
   Origin  (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.167) (0.228) (0.041) (0.014) (0.010) (0.651) 
Latitude (logged)  0.078*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.084** 0.097** 0.009* 0.060*** 0.004** 0.048 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.034) (0.046) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.113) 
Muslim  -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.000*** -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
OPEC  -0.266*** -0.143*** -0.221*** -0.264*** -0.038 -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.009** -0.272** 
  (0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.098) (0.132) (0.015) (0.013) (0.004) (0.250) 
Protestant  0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001*** 0.000** 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Democracy    0.144***        
   (lexical scale)   (0.002)        
Ethnolinguistic    0.078***        
   fract.   (0.017)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 14,167 11,271 10,880 7,175 9,429 148 23,810 6,203 11,107 10,760 
Countries 159 150 149 132 150 148 202 143 150 140 
Years 212 211 211 163 110 1 215 193 211 199 
R2 (pseudo) (0.024) (0.434) (0.728) (0.452) (0.399) (0.468)  (0.444)   
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B17:  Political Constraints 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B17. 
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Table B18:  Checks & Balances 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) 0.008 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.032*** 0.022*** 0.035*** 0.014*** 0.017* 0.004*** 0.018* 
    (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) 
Urbanization  0.036 0.060 0.044 0.054 0.145 0.031 0.037 0.013 0.073 
  (0.064) (0.045) (0.088) (0.065) (0.107) (0.024) (0.080) (0.010) (0.066) 
GDPpc (logged)  0.034* 0.002 0.011 0.031* 0.002 0.014** 0.018 0.000 0.038** 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.006) (0.022) (0.003) (0.019) 
English legal origin  0.344*** 0.114*** 0.411*** 0.360*** 0.484*** 0.165*** 0.343*** 0.056*** 0.369*** 
  (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.056) (0.041) (0.065) (0.007) (0.036) 
French legal origin  0.271*** 0.060* 0.318*** 0.277*** 0.414*** 0.134*** 0.243*** 0.047*** 0.282*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.033) (0.047) (0.040) (0.063) (0.006) (0.031) 
German legal origin  0.272*** 0.055* 0.351*** 0.279*** 0.448*** 0.141*** 0.251*** 0.047*** 0.302*** 
  (0.042) (0.030) (0.033) (0.041) (0.056) (0.042) (0.064) (0.006) (0.038) 
Scandinavian legal   0.460*** 0.210*** 0.548*** 0.466*** 0.657*** 0.197*** 0.440*** 0.078*** 0.493*** 
   Origin  (0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.102) (0.049) (0.080) (0.011) (0.060) 
Latitude (logged)  0.016 -0.016* -0.015 0.014 0.037 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.005 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.024) (0.006) (0.016) (0.002) (0.011) 
Muslim  -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.000*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEC  -0.077** -0.034 -0.066 -0.076** -0.119** -0.045** -0.024 -0.009* -0.083** 
  (0.036) (0.030) (0.046) (0.035) (0.054) (0.018) (0.056) (0.005) (0.038) 
Protestant  -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.002** -0.000*** -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Democracy    0.065***        
   (lexical scale)   (0.003)        
Ethnolinguistic    0.003        
   fract.   (0.027)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 5,702 4,915 4,819 3,285 4,915 144 7,498 3,036 4,740 4,625 
Countries 171 150 150 132 150 144 200 131 149 141 
Years 37 37 37 38 37 1 40 37 36 37 
R2 (pseudo) 0.004 0.516 0.725 0.505 0.519 0.516  0.263  0.515 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B18:  Checks & Balances 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B18. 
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Table B19:  Capital City 
Analysis Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Panel Pooled 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE OLS 
Population t-1 t-1 t-1 t-50 1900 1900 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1, IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 2000 Imputed Electoral Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population (log) -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.000** -0.035*** 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) 
Urbanization  0.147*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.142*** 0.109*** 0.091*** 0.136*** 0.002** 0.209*** 
  (0.024) (0.028) (0.044) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.001) (0.028) 
GDPpc (logged)  -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006) 
English legal origin  0.024* 0.010 0.016 0.001 0.017 0.031 0.028* -0.000 0.014 
  (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.022) (0.015) (0.000) (0.012) 
French legal origin  0.041*** 0.031* 0.030** 0.032** 0.055** 0.039* 0.051*** 0.000 0.029*** 
  (0.010) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.000) (0.009) 
German legal origin  0.070*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.051 0.048* 0.066*** 0.001* 0.059*** 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.033) (0.025) (0.019) (0.001) (0.013) 
Scandinavian legal   0.052* 0.073** 0.108*** 0.092*** 0.100** 0.045 0.054 0.001* 0.051* 
   Origin  (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.042) (0.029) (0.033) (0.001) (0.027) 
Latitude (logged)  -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.000) (0.008) 
Muslim  -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEC  -0.014 -0.005 -0.015 -0.002 -0.022 -0.004 -0.027** -0.000 -0.016 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.000) (0.016) 
Protestant  -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* -0.000** -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Democracy    0.001        
   (lexical scale)   (0.001)        
Ethnolinguistic    -0.019        
   fract.   (0.023)        
Region FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Observations 37,954 15,326 11,310 8,431 11,386 147 23,810 10,032 15,292 14,353 
Countries 186 151 150 132 151 147 202 146 151 142 
Years 210 210 210 161 109 1 215 210 209 198 
R2 (pseudo) 0.497 0.594 0.528 0.523 0.588 0.584  0.613  0.463 
 
Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where 
population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  
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Figure B19:  Capital City 
 
 
Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B19. 
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Appendix C:  Within-Country Data Description 
 
Table C1:  Variable Definitions 
Left-side Variables 
City-county share total expenditures.  Share of state expenditures attributed to cities and counties. Source: 
1942-2012 Census of Governments. state_localshare_exp 
City-county share total revenue.  Share of state revenue attributed to cities and counties. Source: 1942-2012 
Census of Governments. state_localshare_genrev 
Special purpose governments. Number of governmental bodies designated as special purpose within the state. 
Source: 1942-2012 Census of Governments. state_spgs 
Independent school districts. Number of independent school districts operating within the state. Source: 1942-
2012 Census of Governments. state_indep_schooldsts 
CSS0 selection.  Chief State School Officer is appointed (=0) or elected (=1) by direct ballot. Source: National 
Association of State Boards of Education (2016). state_selection_csso 
City share city-county expenditures.  Share of county and local expenditures attributed to cities. Source: 1942-
2012 Census of Governments. county_cityshare_exp 
City share city-county revenue.  Share of county and local revenue attributed to cities. Source: 1942-2012 Census 
of Governments. county_cityshare_rev 
Executive veto.  Chief executive can veto council legislation. Source: ICMA. city_mayoral_veto 
Executive term-limits.  Chief executive is limited to a fixed number of terms in office. Source: ICMA. 
city_term_limits_mayor 
Mayor-council government.  City has a mayor-council form of government (=1) rather than a council-manager 
or commission format (=0). Source: ICMA. city_mayor_council 
Right-side Variables 
Population.  City, county, and state population, transformed by the natural logarithm. Source: U.S. Census. 
city_logpop, state_logpop2012, county_logpop2000 
Income per capita.  Income per capita by municipality, county, and state. Source: U.S. Census & ICPSR County 
Characteristics, 2000-2007.  city_incomepercapitainterp, county_percapita_perincome05, state_ lnincome 
Urbanization.  Urban population as share of total population at state and municipal level. Source: U.S. Census. 
Rural-Urban Continuum code at county levels. Source: ICPSR County Characteristics, 2000-2007. 
state_percent_urban, city_urbanpctpop, county_RuralurbanContinuumCode 
Democratic vote.  For states, the percentage of votes received by the Democratic presidential candidate for the 
closest election year. Source: Federal Election Commission. At county-level, percent of voters that cast their 
ballot for John Kerry in 2004 presidential election. Source: ICPSR County Characteristics, 2000-2007. 
county_PctKerry04state_pctdemvote 
College.  Percentage of residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American 
Community Survey. state_bachelorplus 
Unemployment.  Statewide unemployment rate. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey. 
state_unemploymentrate 
Percent minority.  Percent of residents in state or county that are non-white or of Hispanic/Latino origin. Source: 
U.S. Census. state_percent_minority, county_Per_Minority00  
Region.  Dummies for West, Midwest, Northeast, and South. Source: Authors. state_region 
Black.  Percentage of municipal residents that identify as black. Source: U.S. Census. city_pctblkpopinterp    
Asian. Percentage of municipal residents that identify as Asian. Source: U.S. Census. city_pctasianpopinterp    
Latino.  Percentage of municipal residents that identify as Latino/Hispanic. Source: U.S. Census. 
city_pctlatinopopinterp    
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Table C2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Left-side variables Obs     Mean     SD     Min   Max 
City-county share total expenditures 348 0.488 0.172 0 1 
City-county share total revenue 348 0.556 0.172 0 1 
Special purpose governments 352 0.165 0.188 0 1 
Independent school districts 355 0.076 0.139 0 1 
CSSO selection 366 0.271 0.445 0 1 
City share city-county expenditures 2,677 0.703 0.221 0 1 
City share city-county revenue 2,676 0.679 0.232 0 1 
Executive veto 23,559 0.291 0.454 0 1 
Executive term limits 24,224 0.080 0.271 0 1 
Mayor-council form of government  25,237 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Right-side variables      
Population (logged, state) 356 14.771 1.085 11.192 17.453 
Population (logged, county) 3,003 10.196 1.380 4.205 16.069 
Population (logged, city) 19,753 9.252 1.237 3.091 15.136 
Income per capita (logged, state) 306 9.058 1.115 6.874 11.221 
Income per capita (logged, county) 3,086 10.192 0.218 8.546 11.444 
Income per capita (logged, city) 19,737 10.542 2.340 8.363 23.024 
Urbanization (state) 356 65.626 17.582 19.8 100 
Urbanization (county) 3,143 5.129 1.682 1 9 
Urbanization (city) 20,270 38.729 40.521 0 100 
Democratic vote share (state) 353 45.702 12.062 19.6 95.7 
Democratic vote share (county) 3,113 38.754 12.520 7.1 89.18 
College 357 13.204 7.375 0 39.1 
Unemployment 255 5.985 2.595 2.3 34.7 
Percent minority (state) 354 16.974 15.277 0.1 77.3 
Percent minority (county) 3,143 15.770 18.152 0.132 97.76 
Region  357 2.588 1.193 1 4 
Black 19,735 0.097 0.818 0 84.4 
Asian 19,735 0.027 0.415 0 54.8 
Latino 19,735 0.095 0.259 0 22.4 
Territory (logged, state) 357 11.481 1.466 5.063 14.221 
Territory (logged, county) 3,140 6.492 0.908 0.688 11.891 
Territory (logged, city) 22,026 2.598 1.141 -2.302 8.918 
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Appendix D:  Within-Country Tests, Full Reports 
Table D1:   State-level Outcomes (US) 
Outcomes City-county/total expenditure City-county/total revenue Special purpose governments Independent school districts CSSO selection 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population 
 
0.104*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.070*** 
(0.013) 
0.124*** 
(0.019) 
0.082*** 
(0.016) 
0.124*** 
(0.030) 
0.096*** 
(0.024) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
1.713*** 
(0.626) 
-0.095 
(0.303) 
Income per capita -0.036** 
(0.014) 
 -0.029* 
(0.017) 
 0.008 
(0.015) 
 -0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 0.161 
(0.205) 
 
Urbanization 0.002 
(0.001) 
 0.002 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
 -0.129** 
(0.051) 
 
College -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.0004 
(0.002) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
 -0.042* 
(0.023) 
 
Unemployment  -0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.007 
(0.006) 
 -0.009 
(0.011) 
 -0.002 
(0.002) 
 -0.320** 
(0.130) 
 
Minority -0.004* 
(0.002) 
 -0.004** 
(0.002) 
 -0.00002 
(0.001) 
 0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 0.009 
(0.032) 
 
Democratic vote  -0.003** 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.0003 
(0.002) 
 -0.00007 
(0.0005) 
 -0.077** 
(0.035) 
 
Region           
      Midwest -0.005 
(0.034) 
 -0.037 
(0.032) 
 -0.024 
(0.086) 
 0.023 
(0.015) 
 -3.265*** 
(1.098) 
 
      Northeast -0.078** 
(0.037) 
 -0.090** 
(0.043) 
 -0.114* 
(0.063) 
 -0.004 
(0.015) 
 ____  
       South -0.047 
(0.031) 
 -0.079** 
(0.033) 
 -0.163** 
(0.069) 
 -0.031* 
(0.018) 
 -4.281*** 
(1.563) 
 
           
Polities 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Years 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 2012 
Obs 250 348 250 348 252 352 253 355 200 336 
R2 0.612 0.187 0.610 0.255 0.419 0.297 0.475 0.034 0.196 0.002 
Full specifications from Table 4 along with minimal specifications.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 
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Table D2:  County-level Outcomes (US) 
Outcomes: City/total expenditure City/total revenue 
 1 2 3 4 
Population 
 
 
0.044*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.033*** 
(0.002) 
0.043*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.002) 
Income per capita -0.045*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.054*** 
(0.013) 
 
Urban 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Minority 0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 -0.000008 
(0.0002) 
 
Democratic vote  -0.001** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.004 
(0.0002) 
 
State dummy  √ √ √ √ 
     
Polities 3,153 3,153 3,153 3,153 
Years 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Obs 2,642 2,677 2,641 2,676 
R2 0.756 0.773 0.787 0.799 
 
Full specifications from Table 4 along with minimal specifications.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 
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Table D3:  City-level Outcomes (US) 
Outcomes Executive veto Executive term limits Mayor-council government 
 1 4 2 5 3 6 
 
Population 
 
 
0.212*** 
(0.030) 
0.107*** 
(0.024) 
0.460*** 
(0.042) 
0.431*** 
(0.037) 
0.380** 
(0.193) 
0.547*** 
(0.170) 
Income per  capita -0.012** 
(0.006) 
 -0.029** 
(0.010) 
 0.007 
(0.014) 
 
Urbanization 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.002* 
(0.001) 
 0.003 
(0.004) 
 
% Black -0.075 
(0.202) 
 -0.668* 
(0.350) 
 3.797*** 
(0.942) 
 
% Asian  -3.139*** 
(1.002) 
 0.981 
(0.898) 
 0.105 
(0.917) 
 
% Latino -3.381*** 
(0.335) 
  0.759*** 
(0.292) 
  -0.747 
(0.989) 
  
County dummy √  √  √ √ √ √ 
       
Polities 7,503 7,503 7,503 7,503 2,225 2,225 
Years 1986-2011 1986-2011 1986-2011 1986-2011 1986-2011 1986-2011 
Obs 16,955 18,345 16,439 17,866 1,903 1,944 
R2 0.079 0.050 0.100 0.093 0.237 0.198 
 
Full specifications from Table 4 along with minimal specifications.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 
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Appendix E:  People or Territory? 
We have operationalized size according to the population of a polity rather than its territory, 
even though these two features are obviously linked and also highly correlated – at least across 
nation-states (Pearson’s r=0.79). This is premised on an assumption that population exerts 
greater – or at any rate, more direct – impact on power concentration than territory. 
In previous historical eras, when modes of transport, communication, and control were 
primitive, and when modes of political control leaned more heavily on coercion, land may have 
posed a formidable constraint on the shape of political institutions (Stasavage 2010). In the 
modern era, however, it seems likely the number of people living within a political unit is a more 
important conditioning factor than the size of the territory they inhabit, for reasons laid out in 
Section I.  
Extant work on the question (as it pertains to the modern era) is mixed, as shown in 
Table 1.21 It remains to be seen what picture emerges when a wider set of concentration 
measures and a broader sample of countries is encompassed. 
In Table E1 we replicate benchmark cross-country tests (Model 1 from Table 3), this 
time including territory as an additional predictor. As previously, we present results only for the 
variables of interest – population and territory, both transformed by the natural logarithm. These 
tests confirm the superiority of territory as a predictor of constitutional federalism and revenue 
decentralization (fiscal federalism), as reported in previous studies. Territory is also correlated 
with bicameralism, which may be regarded as a by-product of federalism. However, for other 
outcomes population is generally a more successful predictor. While the estimated coefficient for 
territory is statistically significant in the expected direction in only four out of nineteen tests, the 
estimated coefficient for population is statistically significant (p<.10) in the hypothesized 
direction in fourteen tests. 
In Table E2 we replicate within-country tests (from Table 4) with the addition of 
territory. Again, we present results only for the variables of theoretical interest. Here, results are 
stark. The estimated coefficient for population is correctly signed in all eight tests and statistically 
significant (p<.05) in seven. By contrast, territory is incorrectly signed in five tests and is never 
statistically significant in the expected direction.  
It would seem that population is more strongly related to measures of power 
concentration than territory, at least in the modern era. Of course, this does not rule out the 
                                                
21 Government consumption (Arzaghi & Henderson 2005) and regional authority (Hooghe & Marks 2013) seem to 
be more strongly predicted by population while federalism (Arzaghi & Henderson 2005) and fiscal decentralization 
(Garrett & Rodden 2003; Panizza 1999; Treisman 2006) are more strongly predicted by territory. 
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possibility that territory might affect some outcomes (e.g., constitutional federalism and fiscal 
federalism) but not others, or that it might have a small impact on all outcomes that is not 
detectable in our tests by reason of sample size, measurement error, or specification errors. 
However, if one is inclined to regard power concentration as a coherent theoretical outcome, 
and hence subject to similar causes, the evidence suggests that population trumps territory. 
In our view, the impact of territory is best conceptualized as a prior cause – one that 
affects population but has little or no direct impact on most outcomes of theoretical interest to 
us here. This is the rationale for our choice of instruments in the two-stage analysis presented in 
Table 3 (Model 10). We exclude territory from other models in previous tests because of 
potential problems of collinearity and also, more fundamentally, because the interpretation of 
both variables changes when the other is included in a model. (Controlling for territory, 
population becomes a measure of population density.) 
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Table E1:  Cross-country Tests of Population and Territory 
   POPULATION TERRITORY    
Model Outcome H β/SE C β/SE  C Countries Obs R2 (pseudo) 
1 Federalism +   0.195 (0.263)   1.146 (0.321) *** ü 124 4,807 (0.502) 
2 Subnational gov layers +   0.097 (0.438)   0.450 (0.261) * ü 143 10,695 (0.295) 
3 Subnational elections +   0.031 (0.013) ** ü  0.007 (0.010)  144 10,778 0.329 
4 Autonomous regions +   1.085 (0.338) *** ü -0.494 (0.259) *  146 4,879 (0.339) 
5 Revenue decentraliz +  -0.008 (0.024)   0.078 (0.019) *** ü 94 1,268 0.691 
6 Govt consumption –  -0.018 (0.006) *** ü  0.004 (0.004)  146 5,625 0.337 
7 Separate powers +   0.420 (0.156) *** ü -0.006 (0.099)  145 10,884 (0.334) 
8 Divided party control +   0.028 (0.013) ** ü -0.005 (0.011)  141 7,656 0.139 
9 Decentralized parties +   0.014 (0.011)   0.012 (0.009)  145 10,785 0.535 
10 Judicial review  +   0.026 (0.014) * ü -0.006 (0.012)  145 10,889 0.319 
11 Constitution length +   0.000 (0.000) ** ü -0.000 (0.000) *  144 522 0.652 
12 Constitution scope +   0.016 (0.009) * ü -0.003 (0.006)  144 525 0.552 
13 Constitution rigidity +   0.022 (0.015)   0.002 (0.012)  141 615 0.408 
14 Bicameralism +   0.034 (0.012) *** ü  0.027 (0.009) *** ü 148 11,033 0.325 
15 Leg. Committees +   0.030 (0.010) *** ü -0.003 (0.007)  145 9,322 0.408 
16 Leg. Fractionalization +   0.038 (0.014) *** ü -0.019 (0.011) *  142 7,247 (0.601) 
17 Political constraints +   0.080 (0.002) *** ü -0.052 (0.001) ***  148 11,161 (0.452) 
18 Checks & balances +   0.027 (0.009) *** ü -0.006 (0.007)  149 4,878 0.519 
19 Capital city –  -0.032 (0.004) *** ü -0.001 (0.003)  150 15,265 0.591 
 
Replication of benchmark models in Table 3 (Model 2) with the addition of Territory (square kilometers, logged).  H: hypothesized relationship.  C: hypothesis corroborated.  
Outcome measures of power concentration (re-scaled to 0-1 scale) regressed against key variables and “basic” covariates: per capita GDP (logged), Urbanization, Legal origin 
dummies, Latitude, Muslim, Protestant, OPEC dummy, Region dummies, Year dummies.  (Year dummies not included for CCP outcomes – Constitution Length, Scope, Rigidity – 
because of collinearity.)  Electoral system dummies included in tests of Divided party control (row 8) only.   Right-side variables measured at t-1.  Estimators: ordinary least squares (for 
continuous outcomes), tobit (for left-censored outcomes), ordered logit (for ordinal outcomes), logit (for binary outcomes).  Estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered 
by country) shown for variables of theoretical interest.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 
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Table E2:  Within-Country Tests of Population and Territory 
Polities State County City 
Outcome  City-county/ total expenditures 
City-county/ 
total revenue  
Special purpose 
governments 
Independent 
school districts CSSO selection 
City/total 
expenditure 
City/total 
revenue 
Executive 
veto 
Executive 
term limit 
Mayor- 
council 
Hypothesis + + + + + + + + + + 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full pop>50k 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population 0.077*** 0.103*** 0.118*** 0.021** 1.749*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.516*** 0.412*** 1.331*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.037) (0.008) (0.620) (0.003) (0.003) (0.050) (0.077) (0.325) 
Territory 0.040* (0.024) 
0.032 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.028) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.432 
(0.499) 
0.0002 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.340*** 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.081) 
-0.821*** 
(0.245) 
 
Polities 51 51 51 51 51 3,153 3,153 7,503 7,503 2,225 
Years 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 1942-2012 2000 2000 1986-2011 1986-2011 1986-2011 
Obs 250 250 252 253 200 2,642 2,641 16,872 16,362 1,859 
R2 0.638 0.625 0.420 0.490 0.202 0.756 0.787 0.087 0.099 0.270 
 
Replication of models in Table 4 with the addition of Territory (square kilometers, logged).  Data drawn from states, counties, and cities in the United States.  Covariates for state-
level analyses: Income per capita, urbanization, Democratic vote share, College, Unemployment, Minority (%), Region (dummies). Covariates for county-level analyses: 
Urbanization, Minority (%), Income per capita, Democratic vote, State (dummies).  Covariates for city-level analyses: Urbanization, Black (%), Asian (%), Latino (%), Income per 
capita, County (dummies). County analyses are cross-sectional. State and city analyses represent a short panel, with standard errors clustered at the state and city level, respectively.  
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 
 96 
Appendix F:  Municipal Sovereignty 
Table F1:  Municipal Sovereignty 
 
Outcome: Charter 
Home rule 
(any type) 
Home rule 
structural 
Home rule 
functional 
Home rule 
fiscal 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Population 0.155*** 0.290*** 0.195*** 0.172*** 0.106*** 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.043) (0.036) (0.034) 
Polities 7,503 7,503 7,503 7,503 7,503 
Years 1986-2011 
1986-
2011 
1986-
2011 
1986-
2011 
1986-2011 
Obs 8,204 17,273 17,493 17,273 17,119 
R2 0.072 0.138 0.135 0.098 0.118 
 
Measures of municipal sovereignty regressed on Population (logged) and additional covariates (not shown): 
Urbanization, Black (%), Asian (%), Latino (%), Income per capita, and County (dummies).  Logistic 
regression, standard errors clustered by city.  *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01 
 
